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Abstract
In this dissertation, I examine the causes and consequences of spatial inequality.
Furthermore, I present the most current knowledge on how quantitative spatial
models can serve as a tool to analyze the distribution of economic activity across
space. In a collection of research papers, I investigate in particular (i) how market
integration and fiscal policy shape the spatial allocation of economic activity, and
(ii) how urbanization affects wage inequality. The first and second essays are joint
works with Tobias Seidel and Jens Suedekum.
In the first essay, we use a quantitative model to study the implications of Eu-
ropean integration for welfare and migration flows. The model suggests that the
dismantling of trade barriers in Europe has led to moderate welfare gains and a
more homogeneous spatial distribution of economic activity. We also look ahead
in time and evaluate different scenarios for the Brexit. We find moderate welfare
losses for the UK and continental Europe. In the most unfavorable scenario, about
500,000 people would leave the UK in the long run.
The second essay evaluates the importance of governmental activity for the spa-
tial distribution of economic activity. We use a general equilibrium model with fiscal
equalization to show that regional transfers are quantitatively important for under-
standing the spatial allocation of economic activity. Using data from Germany, we
show that the abolition of fiscal equalization would lead to a welfare gain implying
sizeable migration responses of individuals.
In the third essay, I identify the role of urbanization for wage inequality. A
decomposition of the change in wage inequality suggests that urbanization has con-
tributed about one-third to the growth of wage inequality in (West) Germany be-
tween 1985 and 2009.
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Introduction
How and why does economic activity differ across space? For most of human history,
people moved to seek a better life. Today, more than 50 percent of the worldwide
population lives in cities. This figure will increase to 66 percent by 2050 accord-
ing to the United Nations (2014). It is important to understand the underlying
economic mechanisms of this trend. Policy makers, for example, need to consider
the mobility response of economic agents when they invest in public infrastructure
or redistribute income from rich to poor regions. Quantitative spatial models that
include free mobility of workers between locations allow us to address this issue.1 In
this dissertation, I contribute to the understanding of the causes and consequences
of spatial inequality in three ways.
The first chapter of this thesis is a joint work with Tobias Seidel. We use a
quantitative model to study the implications of European integration for welfare
and migration flows across 1,318 regions. The model shows that an increase of
trade barriers to the level of 1957 reduces welfare by about 1-2 percent on average,
depending on the presumed trade elasticity. However, remote regions may face
initial welfare losses of up to 4 percent, causing an estimated migration of about 8
million individuals to the European core. Hence, the dismantling of trade barriers
in Europe has led to a more homogeneous spatial distribution of economic activity.
We also look ahead in time and evaluate different scenarios for the Brexit. We find
moderate welfare losses of 0.44 percent for the UK in the most pessimistic scenario
while continental Europe’s welfare declines by 0.18 percent. In the most unfavorable
scenario, about 500,000 people would leave the UK in the long run.
The second chapter of this thesis is a joint work with Tobias Seidel and Jens
Suedekum. We use a general equilibrium model with fiscal equalization to show
that regional transfers are quantitatively important for understanding the spatial
allocation of economic activity. We find that the abolition of fiscal equalization
1See for example, Allen and Arkolakis, 2014, Behrens, Mion, Murata, Suedekum, 2017, Red-
ding, 2016.
1
in Germany leads to a moderate welfare gain of about 0.33 percent implying the
migration of about 5 percent of the population in the long run. The rates of in-
crease in average real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and average labor
productivity are more pronounced, at 5.8 percent and 9.2 percent respectively.
In the third chapter, I pursue two goals. First, I explore the link between ur-
banization and wage inequality by using administrative data from (West) Germany.
Second, I study the relative importance of worker- and firm-specific dimensions—
like the distribution of firm size, occupational structure, and job tasks —to precisely
account for the composition of cities.
Urbanization has contributed about 30 percent to the growth of wage inequality.
Up to one-half of the effect occurs because occupations or job tasks with a greater
increase in wage inequality are more concentrated in larger locations. Firm size
explains around one-third, while differences in the industry composition only account
for around one-fourth of the location-inequality premium. Sorting of workers within
those groups across locations only explains a small part. In sum, groups of workers
with an initial unequal pay in the mid-1980s today face even higher inequality in
larger cities compared to smaller cities. This effect varies across the wage distribution
with large positive effects for high-wage workers. Thus, urbanization boosts higher
within-group inequality and contributes to greater inequality especially among high-
skilled workers in Germany.
2
Chapter 1
A spatial perspective on European
integration: Heterogeneous
welfare and migration effects from
the Single Market and the Brexit
We use a quantitative model to study the implications of European integration
for welfare and migration flows across 1,318 regions. The model suggests that
an increase of trade barriers to the level of 1957 reduces welfare by about 1-2
percent on average, depending on the presumed trade elasticity. However,
remote regions may face initial welfare losses of up to 4 percent causing an
estimated migration of about 8 million individuals to the European core. This
implies that the dismantling of trade barriers in Europe has led to a more
homogeneous spatial distribution of economic activity. With regard to the
Brexit, we find moderate welfare losses for the UK of 0.44 percent in the
most pessimistic scenario while continental Europe’s welfare declines by 0.18
percent. In the most unfavorable scenario, about 500,000 people would leave
the UK in the long run.
1.1 Introduction
We know at least since the times of Adam Smith and David Ricardo that the inte-
gration of markets promises welfare gains for all participating countries. However,
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the spatial dimension of these welfare gains within countries and the associated
migration patterns are less understood. Recent developments of rigorous quantita-
tive models that incorporate regions and free mobility of workers between locations
(e.g. Allen and Arkolakis, 2014, Behrens, Mion, Murata, Suedekum, 2017, Redding,
2016) allow us to address this topic. In this paper, we take a closer look at Eu-
ropean integration by applying the spatial perspective. Which regions did benefit
most from the dismantling of trade barriers and what migration pattern did these
heterogeneous welfare effects cause? Addressing these questions aims at a better
understanding of the spatial allocation of economic activity in Europe.
We combine a unique data set on inter-regional trade flows in Europe with a
quantitative spatial model and analyze two events in the integration process of
Europe. First, we raise trade costs to the level before the Common Market was
established in 1957. According to Levchenko and Zhang (2012), trade costs in the
European Union were about 45 percent higher in the 1960s compared to the 2000s.
As substantial trade cost reductions took place with the founding of the European
Community in 1957, we run our counterfactual with 60 percent higher trade costs
across national borders. Second, we estimate welfare changes and implied migration
flows for regions within the UK and in other European countries after the Brexit.
Following Dhingra et al. (2016), we distinguish between an optimistic scenario
where trade costs increase by about 3.7 percent and a pessimistic scenario with a
13.9 percent increase in trade barriers. These counterfactuals inform us about the
magnitude of effects and – more importantly – about (relative) winners and losers
across 1,318 NUTS-3 regions.
The model predicts moderate welfare losses of 1-2 percent when we withdraw
the market integration steps since the introduction of the European Community in
1957. These welfare effects are distributed very heterogeneously across regions. The
periphery experiences welfare losses that are up to six times larger than those in
some core regions, so migration is triggered from remote locations to the European
center. In our baseline scenario, the model suggests overall migration of 8.1 million
individuals or 1.6 percent of the European population. In alternative scenarios,
these figures rise to 11.4 million or 2.3 percent, respectively. European integration
has therefore contributed to a more homogeneous distribution of economic activity.
The Brexit is associated with an increase of trade costs between the UK and
the rest of Europe at national borders. As trade frictions between intra-national
regions and across all other national borders remain unchanged, the model predicts
only small welfare effects ranging between -0.2 and -0.44 percent for the UK in the
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pessimistic scenario. The EU, in contrast, is much less affected with welfare losses
being only half of those in the UK on average. These heterogeneous effects trigger
migration of up to one million individuals in the most unfavorable scenario and with
free migration across European regions. In that case, more than 500,000 individuals
from the UK would relocate to the European Union. If migration is only allowed
within UK boundaries, only 14,000 to 53,000 people migrate to equalize welfare
differences within the country. In all scenarios, Scotland faces the largest losses in
terms of welfare and hence the largest outmigration of people.
It is well understood that single-sector models like the one we use generate mod-
erate welfare effects of trade liberalization. Implementing many sectors that use
other sectors’ output as intermediate inputs in their own production process magni-
fies welfare effects substantially – in Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2014) on average
by a factor of six. We do not put too much emphasis on the level of welfare changes,
but rather stress the heterogeneity across European regions triggering national and
international migration. This establishes a main difference from the quantitative
international trade literature (see Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare, 2014). As migra-
tion decisions are determined by relative welfare effects, we think that the model’s
prediction on migration flows is less sensitive to modelling decisions in this direction.
We build our analysis on recent work by Allen and Arkolakis (2014) employing
an Armington trade model with perfect competition at the local level and heteroge-
neous goods across regions. Individuals are mobile across locations. Higher density
causes both a positive production externality and a negative congestion externality
ensuring stability and uniqueness of the migration equilibrium under certain pa-
rameter conditions. As trade is costly, geography matters for the attractiveness of
locations. In the periphery, for example, distances to trading partners are larger on
average implying higher price indices there compared to centrally-located regions.
With a negative distance elasticity of trade flows exceeding unity, it is immediate
(and well known from the gravity literature) that responses of trade flows to trade
shocks are increasing in distance. This is the underlying force behind heteroge-
neous welfare effects of market integration across Europe and the implied migration
pattern.
Our paper relates to a number of literatures. First, our paper adds to a recent
and growing literature that extends quantitative trade models with factor mobility
and exogenous local characteristics (e.g. Allen and Arkolakis, 2014, Bartelme, 2015,
Behrens, Mion, Murata, Suedekum, 2017, Caliendo, Parro, Rossi-Hansberg and
Sartre, 2014, Monte, Redding and Rossi-Hansberg, 2015, and Redding, 2016). We
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apply this framework to the European context requiring inter-regional trade data
that have not been used at this scale previously. This allows us to provide novel
insights about the regional variation in welfare and migration effects in Europe.
Second, our paper contributes to the quantitative international trade literature
focussing on regional economic integration. In a recent study, Levchenko and Zhang
(2012) apply a multi-sector Ricardian model to explore the welfare implications of
European trade integration. Corcos, Del Gatto, Mion and Ottaviano (2012) ex-
amine welfare effects of intra-EU-15 trade integration in a monopolistic-competition
model with endogenous markups. Apart from building on a different methodological
framework, our work deviates as we focus at heterogeneous implications at a more
disaggregated regional level and account for both inter-regional and international
migration flows.
Third, we contribute to the debate on the economic consequences of a withdrawal
of the United Kingdom from the European Union. To the best of our knowledge, we
are only aware of one paper by Dhingra et al. (2016) quantifying welfare effects of
the Brexit. In contrast to their paper, our approach allows us to highlight welfare
changes at the regional level within the UK and derive migration responses.
The paper is organized as follows. We first introduce the model in section 1.2.
Section 1.3 discusses quantification and the data we use. We discuss counterfactuals
in section 1.4 before offering concluding remarks in section 1.5.
1.2 A quantitative spatial model
We consider an economy with a continuum of locations i ∈ S and L¯ mobile workers.1
Each location produces one unique variety of a good under perfect competition like
in Armington (1969) or Anderson (1979). Goods can be shipped to other locations
at iceberg costs such that τ(i, s) ≥ 1 units have to be sent from i for one unit to
arrive in s.2 Intra-regional trade costs, τ(i, i), are normalized to unity. Further,
locations differ from each other with regard to productivity A(i), amenities u(i) and
remoteness being determined by bilateral trade costs with their trade partners.
1The continuum of locations is only for generalization. Later in the analysis we will only rely
on a discrete number of locations.
2We assume that the triangle inequality holds for any τ(i, s), i.e. τ(i, s) < τ(i, k)τ(k, s) for any
i, s and k.
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1.2.1 Preferences
Workers have identical preferences over the continuum of varieties that can be sub-
stituted with each other with a constant elasticity of substitution σ > 1. They also
care about the utility derived from a local consumption amenity such that
W (i) =
(∫
s∈S
q(s, i)σ−1σ ds
) σ
σ−1
u(i), (1.1)
where q(s, i) denotes consumption of the variety in location i that is produced in s.3
Welfare is increasing in both the quantity consumed and the number of differentiated
varieties as well as in local amenities u(i). Maximizing utility subject to income
yields individual demand for a variety from s in location i
q(s, i) = w(i)p(s, i)−σP (i)σ−1, (1.2)
where w(i) is the nominal wage paid in i, p(s, i) denotes the consumer price in i and
P (i) represents the price index.
1.2.2 Profit maximization and inter-regional trade
With labor as the only factor of production and provided that perfect competition on
the product market equates prices to marginal costs, we obtain consumer prices as
p(s, i) = τ(s, i)w(s)/A(s), where, A(s) denotes location-specific labor productivity.
With these ingredients at hand, we are able to derive a gravity equation for bilateral
trade flows between locations. Letting X(i, s) be the value of shipments from i to
s, we have
X(i, s) =
(
τ(i, s)w(i)
A(i)P (s)
)1−σ
w(s)L(s), (1.3)
where 1− σ is the trade elasticity of the CES demand system and P (i) is the CES
price index:
P (i) =
[∫
s∈S
τ(s, i)1−σA(s)σ−1w(s)1−σds
] 1
1−σ
. (1.4)
3Allen and Arkolakis (2014) demonstrate that it is straightforward to introduce locational
preferences into the utility function. This only affects the elasticity of amenities with respect to
population as discussed below.
7
1.2.3 Agglomeration and dispersion forces
Local productivities and amenities are determined by an exogenous component,
A¯(i) and u¯(i), and an endogenous part dependent on a location’s population. The
composite productivity level is given by
A(i) = A¯(i)L(i)α, (1.5)
where α ≥ 0 represents the elasticity of productivity with respect to population den-
sity. This formalization is a short cut for agglomeration externalities like knowledge
spillovers or labor-market pooling that increase firm productivity in location i.4 In
contrast, higher population density also causes congestion externalities rendering a
location less attractive. Local amenities are defined as
u(i) = u¯(i)L(i)β, (1.6)
with β ≤ 0 capturing the idea of a negative congestion externality.
1.2.4 Equilibrium
We use the following equilibrium conditions to solve the model:
1. Labor market clearing. This implies
∫
s∈S
L(s)ds = L¯. (1.7)
2. Goods market clearing. In equilibrium, the aggregate value of the good
sold to all destinations is equal to total income, so
w(i)L(i) =
∫
s∈S
X(i, s)ds ∀i ∈ S. (1.8)
3. Welfare equalization. Free mobility of labor ensures that welfare is equal-
ized across all locations. Using insights from above, we can express welfare in
location i as a function of the location-specific amenity and real wages,
W (i) = w(i)
P (i)u(i). (1.9)
4See Combes and Gobillon (2015) for a recent overview of the empirical literature on agglom-
eration economies.
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Remote locations are characterized by a higher price index which has to
be compensated by higher nominal wages and/or higher amenities than in
centrally-located places for W (i) to be equalized across all i ∈ S.
We derive a system of equations that allows us to (i) determine exogenous pro-
ductivities and amenities and (ii) solve for endogenous wages and labor allocation
across regions in the counterfactual analysis. Combining (1.3) and (1.9) with (1.8),
we get
W σ−1L(i)1−α(σ−1)w(i)σ =
∫
S
τ(i, s)1−σA¯(i)σ−1u¯(s)σ−1L(s)1+β(σ−1)w(s)σds (1.10)
Second, combining utility, (1.9), with the price index (1.4) delivers
W σ−1L(i)β(1−σ)w(i)1−σ =
∫
S
τ(s, i)1−σA¯(s)σ−1u¯(i)σ−1L(s)α(σ−1)w(s)1−σds, (1.11)
where (1.5) and (1.6) have been substituted for composite productivities and ameni-
ties. Feeding the system of equations with information on bilateral trade costs, wages
and population delivers solutions for exogenous productivities and amenities up to
a constant with W σ−1 as the eigenvalue of the system.5 Allen and Arkolakis (2014)
show that there is a unique and stable equilibrium if α + β ≤ 0.
1.3 Quantification
Quantifying the model requires estimates for bilateral trade costs τ(i, s), exogenous
productivities A¯(i) and exogenous amenities u¯(i). We discuss identification, data
sources and results for these steps sequentially in the following two subsections.
The basic geographic unit is the third level of administrative division called the
Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS-3). NUTS-3 regions are
jurisdictional entities whose average population usually ranges between 150,000 and
800,000 people.6 We choose the aggregation level of locations in a way to justify
the assumption of no commuting and no spillovers between locations. The analysis
contains information for 26 EU countries plus Norway in 2010 which leaves us with
1,318 European regions.
5Allen and Arkolakis (2014) show how this system of equations can be translated into a single
nonlinear equation system. We follow their procedure in solving and quantifying the model.
6The principles and characteristics of the nomenclature of territorial units for statistics are
available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nuts/principles-and-characteristics.
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1.3.1 Parametrization of trade costs
To the best of our knowledge, there is no data set that contains information on
inter-regional trade flows between all European NUTS-3 regions. However, German
authorities provide information on a subset of inter-regional trade flows compris-
ing information on the annual volume of intra-German and European shipments
(in metric tons) that went through German territory in 2010. The data come from
the Forecast of Nationwide Transport Relations in Germany 2030 (Verkehrsverflech-
tungsprognose 2030, henceforth VVP) provided by the Clearing House of Transport
Data at the Institute of Transport Research of the German Aerospace Center.7 The
dataset allows us to differentiate by mode of transportation (road, rail, water) and
by product category. We do not rely on transportation by mode, however, and
aggregate shipments over all transport modes at the first level of the NST2007 clas-
sification.8
Table 1.1 provides an overview of the VVP-data coverage by comparing the re-
ported aggregated trade volumes at the country level to those in COMTRADE.9
First, we observe that about 87 percent of trade flows refer to intra-German trans-
actions that are not covered by COMTRADE. Trade of German regions with other
European regions makes up about 9 percent leaving about 4 percent of the overall
volume as transit shipments. Second, we aggregate up trade volumes between re-
gions in Germany and the 28 European countries that are member of the European
Union (EU) plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland that are members
of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). COMTRADE covers 98 percent
of the volumes reported in the VVP-dataset for 2010 indicating high quality of the
regional trade data we use. With regard to bilateral trade flows between the set
of European economies without Germany, however, the VVP-dataset covers only
12 percent of the COMTRADE volume. This makes sense as VVP only reports
those trade flows between European countries that transit through Germany. In the
case of Spain and France, for instance, it is hard to imagine that goods should be
shipped via Germany. If there is a systematically lower coverage of trade flows for
more distant locations, estimates of distance elasticities could be biased. We there-
7The data can be accessed via http://daten.clearingstelle-verkehr.de/276/.
8NST is the abbreviation for Nomenclature uniforme des marchandises pour les statistiques
de transport. This system represents a standard classification for transport statistics for goods
transported by road, rail, inland waterways and sea (maritime) at the European level since 2008
and is based on the classifications of products by activity (CPA).
9Notice that COMTRADE data are only available at the country level, but contain both volume
and value information at the product level.
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Table 1.1: Aggregate trade volumes: COMTRADE vs. VVP
COMTRADE VVP
Germany - Rest of Europe 279.39 285.49
Rest of Europe - Rest of Europe 1,175.18 145.30
Germany - Germany - 2,854.82
Notes: This table reports aggregate trade volumes in million metric tons. Column 2 reveals
data from COMTRADE. Column 3 presents trade volumes from the Forecast of Nationwide
Transport Relations in Germany 2030 (VVP). Both columns refer to the year 2010.
fore focus on inter-regional trade flows where a German region is either an exporter
or an importer. We relegate further details on this dataset to Appendix 1.A.
As the regional trade data only contain information on volumes, we need to
obtain values to apply the gravity equation. To this end, we define the ratio of
values and quantities based on trade data from COMTRADE for the same set of
countries and 2-digit product categories in 2010 to compute trade values. With this
information at hand, we run a standard gravity regression to uncover the distance
elasticity of trade flows. We follow the standard procedure in the gravity literature
(see, e.g., Head and Mayer, 2014, for an overview) by estimating (1.3) with importer
and exporter fixed effects to control for multilateral resistance. We proxy bilateral
trade costs by distance according to
τ(i, s) = dist(i, s)θ ˜(i, s), (1.12)
where ˜(i, s) is the error term. GIS software delivers Euclidian distances dist(i, s)
between the centroids of locations i and s, so we end up with a 1, 318×1, 318 matrix.
Log-linearizing (1.3) and substituting for the parametrization of trade costs yields
the following gravity equation for the value of bilateral trade flows from i to s:
logX(i, s) = δ(i) + γ(s)− (σ − 1)θ log dist(i, s) + (1− σ)β′M+ log (i, s), (1.13)
where δ(i) and γ(s) are exporter and importer fixed effects that control for wages,
productivity, population and the CES price index.10 M collects standard bilat-
eral control variables from the gravity literature like common border, language or
contiguity and log (i, s) = (1− σ) log ˜(i, s).
10As the data distinguishes between product groups, we add product fixed effects in the esti-
mation.
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Table 1.2: Estimated distance elasticities
volumes values
log(distance) -1.21*** -1.15*** -1.24*** -1.17***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
language 0.04 0.02
(0.021) (0.019)
contiguity -0.14*** -0.17***
(0.008) (0.008)
border -1.05*** -1.18***
(0.011) (0.010)
Constant 18.50*** 20.20*** 4.32*** 6.30***
(0.030) (0.043) (0.026) (0.038)
Exporter FE X X X X
Importer FE X X X X
Product FE X X X X
Observations 1,772,302 1,772,302 2,228,320 2,228,320
R2 0.71 0.72 0.37 0.38
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 use the original volume data from VVP.
Columns 3 and 4 are based on trade values where we have used the
simple average of unit values per 2-digit product group. Robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 1.2 summarizes the regression output. Columns 3 to 4 build on bilateral
trade values as the dependent variable where the latter specification adds commonly-
used non-geographic covariates like language, contiguity and border. Following
Nitsch and Wolf (2013), we also explore results for volumes instead of values as
the dependent variable in Columns 1 and 2. Although this deviates from the theo-
retical model, it can be argued that trade values are proportional to trade volumes
so the results are insightful for robustness reasons. Further, exporter and product-
specific dummy variables account for the exporter- and product-specific price per
ton that converts volume of exports into values.
The estimated coefficients on log distance are remarkably similar and range be-
tween −1.15 and −1.24, independent of using values or volumes. Moreover, the
estimates are all statistically different from zero at the 1-percent level. Comparing
our findings to those in the gravity literature establishes further credibility. Head
and Mayer (2014) summarize that estimates of the trade-distance elasticity param-
eter in typical gravity equations cluster around -1.1 with a standard deviation of
0.41.
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1.3.2 Identifying location fundamentals
A second piece of information that is unobservable from data, but required for quan-
tification of the model, are values of exogenous productivities A¯(i) and amenities
u¯(i). To uncover these model parameters, we feed estimated trade costs together
with information on population L(i) and wages w(i) (proxied by GDP per capita)
into (1.10) and (1.11). Both variables are provided by Eurostat at the NUTS-3
regional level. We divide total population of each region in 2010 by the area of
that region and normalize both the population density and wages to have a mean
of one.11
We use the structure of the model to solve for the overall productivity A(i) and
amenity u(i) level. Then we use (1.6) and (1.5) to identify A¯(i) and amenity u¯(i) for
all possible combinations of α and β. In the baseline, we follow Allen and Arkolakis
(2014) in choosing α = 0.1 and β = −0.3. These values can be justified as follows:
Rosenthal and Strange (2004) highlight empirical evidence for positive productivity
externalities with respect to population density of close to 10 percent. The value
for β can be retrieved from expenditure share data on housing. Allen and Arkolakis
(2014) demonstrate that the model is isomorphic to a class of theories where workers
spend a constant share 1− δ of their income on differentiated goods and δ on local
non-tradable goods (e.g. housing) with β = −δ/(1 − δ). According to Eurostat,
average expenditure on housing amounted to 24.2 percent in the EU (28 countries)
in 2010 justifying the chosen value for β.12 In the baseline scenario, we choose σ = 9,
which is in line with the preferred trade elasticity of 8 in Eaton and Kortum (2002).
As a sensitivity check, we use σ = 5 implying a trade elasticity of 4 as suggested
by Simonovska and Waugh (2014). Additionally, we calculate the model for a wider
range of spillover parameters for sensitivity.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the distribution of exogenous productivities (Panel (a))
and amenities (Panel (b)) across European regions in the baseline case. Locations
with high per-capita income have higher values of exogenous productivity, like in
central Europe and Scandinavia. Eastern Europe features comparably low levels
of exogenous productivity. The picture changes when we take a look at exogenous
amenities. Technically speaking, the model predicts higher values of u¯(i) for loca-
tions with lower income to rationalize the location choice of people living there. This
11See Allen and Arkolakis (2014) for details.
12We use information on the final consumption expenditure of households by consumption
purpose (COICOP 3 digit) from Eurostat with the code: nama_10_co3_p3.
13
is why Eastern European regions show darker colors (i.e. higher values) of u¯(i) in
Panel (b) of Figure 1.1.
Combining our estimates for trade costs, exogenous productivities and amenities
with wages, it is instructive to take a look at the implied price index in each location.
Figure 1.2 illustrates the resulting geographic variation. The figure shows that
our specification of trade costs as a constant elasticity function of distance leads
to concentric circles around the geographic center of Europe. Intuitively, remote
locations like Greece, Portugal or Finland have the highest price index so we can
use P (i) as a proxy for remoteness below.
1.4 Counterfactuals
Based on the fundamentals of the model, we proceed by studying two major events
of European integration. First, we withdraw the market integration steps since the
foundation of the European Community in 1957 including the establishment of the
Common and the Single Market. Second, we look ahead in time and evaluate dif-
ferent scenarios for the Brexit. Apart from overall effects on welfare and migration,
we are particularly interested in the differences in welfare responses across regions
and their implied migration flows that shape the economic landscape of Europe in
the long run. As we have quantified the model based on data from 2010, we eval-
uate previous episodes of trade liberalization by simulating a situation prior to the
respective reduction in trade costs. This means, we raise trade barriers to the level
before the European Community was founded and compare this outcome to the sta-
tus quo. Moreover, we keep the number of countries fixed. One might object that
it is unnecessary to “replicate” the past as we can simply take a look at historical
data. The rigidity of the model, however, allows us to abstract from other factors
that have shaped the development of the local economy over time (e.g. technological
change, population growth or changes in preferences) and simply focus on the im-
plications of changes in trade costs. With regard to the Brexit, of course, we make
statements about a trade shock that lies ahead of the baseline year 2010.
It is noteworthy that changes of trade costs have a specific flavor in our model.
Trade integration is associated with lower barriers across national borders while
bilateral trade costs do not change within countries. This is one of the novel aspects
of quantitative spatial models allowing us to also study differential responses of
border regions compared to non-border regions. We proceed in the standard way by
using the estimated primitives of the model jointly with counterfactual trade costs
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Figure 1.1: Estimated exogenous productivities and amenities
(a) Exogenous productivities
(b) Exogenous amenities
Notes: This figure plots the exogenous productivity A¯(i) and amenity u¯(i) for α = 0.1 and β˜ =
−0.3. A darker shading indicates higher values.
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Figure 1.2: Estimated Price Index
Notes: This figure plots the estimated price index P (i) for α = 0.1 and β = −0.3. A darker
shading indicates higher values.
to solve for wages and population density. Relating these values to observed data
on wages and population in 2010 allows us to compute welfare changes and implied
migration flows as a response to these hypothetical trade shocks.
1.4.1 Reversing the Common and Single Market
The introduction of the Common Market in 1957 and the Single Market in 1992
were two important steps towards a reduction of trade barriers within the European
Union. Levchenko and Zhang (2012) have estimated that trade costs within Western
Europe were about 45 percent higher in the 1960s compared to the 2000s. As
trade barriers were substantially reduced in the 1950s already, Levchenko and Zhang
(2012) admit that their estimate understates the overall difference in trade costs from
before European integration to the present. Nevertheless, we use these estimates as
a helpful point of departure and suppose that trade costs in the 1950s were about 60
16
percent higher than in 2010.13 Then the model informs us about changes in welfare
and population density. Of course, we ignore changes in exogenous productivities
and amenities over time and only let changes in trade barriers drive welfare changes
and migration according to the model.
We simulate the model for three different mobility scenarios: no labor mobility,
intranational labor mobility, and international (within Europe) labor mobility. Table
1.3 reports welfare changes by country in Columns 1 to 3 in the absence of labor
mobility and implied changes in population in Columns 4 to 6 when workers can
freely choose their place of residence. Note that the average welfare changes in
Column 1 are realized for all regions within a country when labor is allowed to move
within national boundaries. In our benchmark specification, the model predicts an
average welfare loss of 1.1 percent. However, the regional differences are enormous.
Looking at average welfare changes by country, it is immediate that countries that
are located in the periphery of Europe lose most while those in the center lose least.
To name a few examples, Greece (-3.1 percent), Finland (-2.8 percent) or Portugal
(-2.7 percent) lose more than Belgium (-0.8 percent), Germany (-0.8 percent) or
France (-0.9 percent). At the regional level, these disparities become even more
pronounced. The largest loss is observed in Greece with nearly 4 percent while the
region with the lowest welfare loss of 0.59 percent is located in Germany – in the
centre of Europe.
If we allow people to migrate to those places that offer the highest welfare level,
we observe from Columns 4 to 6 that migration would take place from the periphery
to the core. There are only 6 out of 27 countries that experience immigration, namely
Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
Greece is predicted to lose nearly 6 percent of its population as a response to this
trade shock in the long run, some Greek regions even up to 8 percent. Corresponding
to the welfare results, the region with the largest inflow of people can be found in
Germany where the population is predicted to increase by 1.53 percent. Translating
these figures to absolute migration flows delivers a value of 8.12 million individuals or
1.6 percent of the European population that would change their region of residence
as a response to this trade shock.
13We have also derived results for trade costs changes of 50 percent and 100 percent, respectively,
to assess the sensitivity of results. The overall welfare change increases by a factor of 1.8 when we
increase trade costs changes from 50 to 100 percent.
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Table 1.3: Welfare change and implied migration flows
No mobility International mobility
Country ∆W (i) min max ∆L(i) min max
Austria -1.44 -1.57 -1.07 -0.79 -1.39 0.09
Belgium -0.78 -0.79 -0.77 0.97 0.92 1.00
Bulgaria -2.78 -3.07 -2.49 -5.14 -5.83 -4.14
Croatia -1.74 -2.14 -1.58 -2.06 -3.11 -1.44
Czech Republic -1.32 -1.60 -1.11 -0.76 -1.50 -0.02
Denmark -1.42 -1.52 -1.24 -0.88 -1.27 -0.43
Estonia -2.69 -2.83 -2.50 -4.73 -5.19 -4.20
Finland -2.84 -3.70 -2.43 -5.70 -7.76 -4.00
France -0.90 -1.57 -0.73 0.03 -1.41 1.12
Germany -0.76 -0.99 -0.59 0.96 0.31 1.53
Greece -3.13 -3.82 -2.72 -5.89 -8.03 -4.81
Hungary -1.84 -2.09 -1.62 -2.26 -2.98 -1.55
Ireland -1.52 -1.76 -1.48 -1.62 -2.02 -1.18
Italy -1.69 -2.75 -1.17 -2.04 -4.90 -0.20
Latvia -2.42 -2.64 -2.23 -4.07 -4.62 -3.40
Lithuania -2.27 -2.46 -2.10 -3.52 -4.09 -3.02
Luxembourg -0.81 -0.80 -0.80 0.90 0.90 0.90
Netherlands -0.83 -0.93 -0.76 0.80 0.50 1.01
Norway -1.97 -3.97 -1.65 -3.57 -8.53 -1.69
Poland -1.70 -2.14 -1.34 -1.90 -3.12 -0.74
Portugal -2.67 -3.02 -2.36 -4.63 -5.70 -3.76
Romania -2.71 -3.00 -2.17 -4.37 -5.63 -3.18
Slovakia -1.72 -1.97 -1.58 -1.96 -2.62 -1.44
Slovenia -1.56 -1.61 -1.47 -1.36 -1.54 -1.11
Spain -2.75 -3.03 -1.75 -3.51 -5.71 -1.96
Sweden -1.99 -3.35 -1.52 -3.12 -6.73 -1.28
United Kingdom -0.96 -1.57 -0.75 0.19 -1.45 1.04
Notes: This table reports percentage change in welfare and population in response to a 60
percent increase of trade costs between European countries. Columns 1-3 assume no labor
mobility and report average welfare changes per country as well as minimum and maximum
values across regions. Column 4 reports the percentage change in population when we al-
low for labor to move freely across all locations. Columns 5 and 6 show the minimum and
maximum population change in a region per country.
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To better understand the importance of location fundamentals for the change in
welfare, we derive conditional correlations from a simple regression of the form
∆W (i) = β0 + β1L0(i) + β2A¯(i) + β3u¯(i) + β4P0(i) + β5border + (i). (1.14)
∆W (i) denotes the percentage change in welfare for the scenario without labor mo-
bility, L0(i) and P0(i) reflect population density and the price index in location i
prior to the change in trade costs. The latter can be interpreted as a measure of
remoteness as regions located in the periphery are characterized by higher average
trade costs and thus higher values of P0(i). Exogenous productivities, A¯(i), exoge-
nous amenities, u¯(i), and a dummy variable equal to one for all regions adjacent
to a national border complete the list of covariates. (i) reflects a stochastic error
term. We run two versions of the above specification, one without and one with
country fixed effects, to explore the relevance of unobserved country characteristics.
It is immediate from Table 1.4 that remoteness, as proxied by the price index, turns
out to play the most important role. Also the border dummy turns out significant.
In contrast, the estimates for initial population density or exogenous productivity
are not statistically different from zero. As ∆W (i) is negative for all locations, we
can infer that a higher initial price index leads to stronger negative responses to
increases in trade costs. border exerts the same impact qualitatively.
P0(i) and border represent measures for remoteness at the European and the
national level, respectively, so the estimation results indicate that regions are affected
differently by a common trade cost shock. Although trade barriers are only raised at
national borders in this counterfactual exercise, regions in the European periphery
(those with a higher price index) lose more if the trade elasticity exceeds minus one.
This is a standard insight from international trade theory (see, e.g. Anderson and
van Wincoop, 2003). A similar argument can be made with respect to a region’s
location within a country. If located close to a national border, raising trade barriers
at the border increases the remoteness of this location relative to other non-border
locations in the same country. This is why, controlling for overall remoteness through
P0(i), border comes out with a negative sign.
To get a feeling for the sensitivity of the results, we repeat the counterfactual
exercise for alternative values of σ, α, and β and compute associated welfare
changes and implied overall migration flows in millions and in percent of the
European population. We compare σ = 9, which is in line with the preferred
trade elasticity of 8 in Eaton and Kortum (2002), with σ = 5 implying a trade
elasticity of 4 as suggested by Simonovska and Waugh (2014). Further, we
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Table 1.4: Welfare change and location characteristics
(1) (2)
initial pop. density 0.027 -0.002
(0.027) (0.007)
exog. productivity 0.214 0.070
(0.159) (0.054)
exog. amenity -0.330*** -0.031
(0.186) (0.058)
initial price index -3.330*** -3.816***
(1.06) (0.171)
border region dummy -0.414*** -0.069***
(0.13) (0.024)
Country FE 7 X
R2 0.85 0.98
Observations 1,318 1,318
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of welfare changes in per-
cent, ∆W (i), without labor mobility on a region’s characteristics.
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,
*** p < 0.001
double the productivity elasticity α and reduce the congestion elasticity β to
-0.6. As shown by Allen and Arkolakis (2014), the model can be straightforwardly
extended to account for heterogeneous locational preferences of workers where
β = β0 − 1/θ. Setting the Frechet shape parameter θ = 3, as suggested by Bryan
and Morten (2014) and used in Redding (2016), and keeping the baseline congestion
elasticity at β0 = −0.3 we arrive at a value of approximately -0.6.
Table 1.5 provides an overview of results. We observe that reducing σ from a
value of 9 to 5 roughly doubles welfare responses – from our baseline scenario of -1.11
percent (row 1) to -2.08 percent (row 5). Intuitively, a lower elasticity of substitution
implies that consumers do not respond as elastically to changes in relative prices by
substituting expensive goods. As a consequence, higher trade costs lead to larger
changes in the overall price index and thus in welfare. Notice, however, that the
ranking of welfare losses across regions is not affected. Migration flows respond
less sensitively to reductions in σ than welfare. Nevertheless, overall migration is
predicted to rise by around 40 percent compared to the benchmark.
Accounting for locational preferences (higher value of β) or a higher productivity
elasticity α does not lead to major changes in welfare responses. However, migra-
tion is naturally affected a lot. If individuals have preferences to reside in certain
locations, they are more reluctant to move in response to exogenous shocks. Thus
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Table 1.5: Sensitivity: Welfare and European migration
σ α β
Wˆ Lˆ Lˆ
(in percent) (in millions) (in percent)
9 0.1 -0.3 -1.11 8.12 1.60
9 0.1 -0.6 -1.16 4.17 0.82
9 0.2 -0.3 -1.06 11.30 2.23
9 0.2 -0.6 -1.15 4.88 0.96
5 0.1 -0.3 -2.08 11.41 2.25
5 0.1 -0.6 -2.18 6.64 1.31
5 0.2 -0.3 -2.00 14.18 2.80
5 0.2 -0.6 -2.15 7.49 1.48
Notes: This table reports welfare changes and migration (in mil-
lions and in percent of the total population) for different param-
eter values of σ, α and β when trade costs are increased by 60
percent between countries.
raising β nearly halves migration flows to about 4 million individuals. The opposite
happens, of course, if the positive agglomeration externality rises. In that case,
wages respond more elastically to every additional immigrant rendering the location
more attractive for other individuals from other locations. Comparing rows 1 and 3
reveals that overall European migration increases by about 40 percent. Interestingly,
if we combine both effects (as shown in row 4), migration remains substantially lower
than in the baseline scenario.
As regions are affected to different extents, we finally examine how an increase
in trade barriers at national borders affect the distribution of local GDP. Table 1.6
summarizes three different measures of inequality, namely variance, Gini-index, and
Theil-index, before the trade cost shock and after the shock with intranational labor
mobility and international labor mobility. We observe that the inequality measures
increase by 0.54 percent, 0.02 percent and 0.11 percent, respectively, if workers can
freely migrate within national borders. Allowing for international migration raises
inequality by a factor of 4-8. The variance is now predicted to increase by 2.2
percent, the Gini-index rises by 0.16 percent while the Theil-index goes up by 0.4
percent. In sum, the numbers suggest that trade integration in Europe has led to a
more equal distribution of economic activity across regions.
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Table 1.6: Reversing European integration: Inequality of local GDP
Var ∆V ar(%) Gini ∆Gini(%) Theil ∆Theil(%)
before the shock 49.75 0.81 1.71
after the shock,
intranational mobility 50.02 0.54 0.81 0.02 1.71 0.11
after the shock,
international mobility 50.84 2.18 0.81 0.16 1.72 0.42
Notes: This table reports the level and percentage changes of inequality statistics of local gross
domestic product (GDP).
1.4.2 The Brexit
Turning from a historical event to the present, we use the model to study the im-
plications of the Brexit for regional welfare and migration in both the UK and
continental Europe. In 2013, Britain’s prime minister David Cameron announced
to hold a referendum about membership in the European Union. Three years later,
51.9 percent of voters supported a withdrawal from the EU inducing prime minister
Cameron to step back.14 While the conditions of Brexit will be negotiated in the
near future, it is expected that UK’s access to the Single Market will be restricted
implying higher trade frictions between the UK and the rest of the EU.
We consider two scenarios of how trade costs change after the Brexit following
Dhingra et al. (2016). In the optimistic scenario we assume that the UK would face
one quarter of the tariff-equivalent of non-tariff barriers between the USA and the
EU. Berden et al. (2013) have estimated this value at 14.7 percent. This delivers a
total trade cost increase of ∆τ(i, s)EU−UK = 0.25×NTBEU−USA = 0.25×14.7 = 3.67
percent.
The pessimistic scenario presumes that international trade takes place under the
regulations of the World Trade Organization. Both the UK and the EU will then
apply their most favoured nation tariff (MFN) on imports. Adding 75 percent of
the tariff equivalent of non-tariff barriers between the EU and the USA, we get a
total trade cost increase of ∆τ(i, s)EU−UK = 0.75×NTBEU−USA +MFNEU−UK =
0.75× 14.7 + ((3.09 + 2.6)/2) = 13.87 percent. It is noteworthy that we raise trade
costs between regions located in the UK and those in other EU countries while
intranational trade costs remain identical everywhere.
14See Dhingra et al. (2016) for a more detailed exposition.
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If we allow labor mobility within the UK and within the rest of Europe separately,
the model predicts that welfare in the UK declines by 0.23 percent in the pessimistic
scenario and by 0.06 percent in the optimistic case. Continental Europe is affected
less with changes of -0.09 percent and -0.03 percent, respectively. If we reduce the
elasticity of substitution to σ = 5, the welfare effects roughly double. More precisely,
welfare is predicted to decline in the UK by 0.44 percent and 0.12 percent in the
pessimistic and optimistic case, respectively. The figures for continental Europe are
0.18 percent and 0.05 percent. These numbers are fairly small, but in line with
single-sector trade models predicting only moderate welfare changes in response
to trade costs.15 Dhingra et al. (2016) find welfare losses of 1.28 percent and
2.61 percent in the pessimistic and the optimistic scenario, respectively, employing
a multi-sector Armington trade model à la Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2014).
While it is well understood that introducing multiple sectors and intermediate goods
magnifies welfare effects, our focus is on heterogeneous effects across regions and
their implied migration consequences. Moreover, in Dhingra et al. (2016) the change
in welfare is mainly due to the assumption that intra-EU trade barriers decline by
5.7-10.5 percent in the next decade. If we allowed for this effect in addition, our
welfare responses would increase by a factor of two in the pessimistic and five in the
optimistic scenario.
Panel (a) of Figure 1.3 offers a graphical illustration of changes in welfare in the
pessimistic scenario when labor is assumed to be immobile. This would be the initial
shock and is instructive to evaluate to what extent locations are affected differently.
We observe that Scotland experiences the largest initial welfare loss of about 0.3
to 0.38 percent while welfare declines by only 0.17 to 0.21 percent in the London
area. In the rest of Europe, regions in the vicinity of the UK like Belgium or the
Netherlands face the lowest welfare losses of about 0.02 percent. Similar effects
occur in Ireland.
Panel (b) of Figure 1.3 shows percentage changes of population based on free
mobility within the UK and within continental Europe (plus Ireland), respectively.
Corresponding to the welfare results, Scotland experiences the largest decline in
population of up to 0.88 percent. In contrast, the south of England gains up to
0.27 percent. Intuitively, Scotland suffers from its remote position relative to the
geographic center of Europe and there are no regions in the North that could serve
as substitute trade partners. Looking at migration responses in continental Europe,
it is astonishing that a similar pattern leads to higher densities in the core (like
15See the survey by Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2014).
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Figure 1.3: Estimated welfare and population changes in percent
(a) Welfare
Welfare change, percent
-0.38 - -0.29
-0.28 - -0.26
-0.26 - -0.23
-0.23 - -0.20
-0.20 - -0.17
(b) Population
Population change, percent
-0.88 - -0.37
-0.33 - -0.13
-0.12 - 0.00
0.00 - 0.13
0.13 - 0.28
Notes: This figure plots the percentage change in welfare in Panel (a) and population density in
Panel (b) after the Brexit in the pessimistic scenario where trade costs between the UK and the
EU increase by 13.9 percent for EU-UK trade flows.
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Belgium, the Netherlands, parts of Germany and France) at the expense of the
periphery. Population is predicted to increase by about 0.16 to 0.5 percent in this
greater area.
As the above results relate only to the scenario where labor can migrate within
the UK or within the rest of Europe, we are also interested in migration patterns with
free mobility across Europe. We therefore compute migration flows both in total
and as a share of the population in the UK and in the rest of Europe, respectively,
rather than relative to each NUTS3-region. We observe from Table 1.7 that total
migration within the UK amounts to about 52,000 individuals or 0.08 percent of
the population if we consider the pessimistic scenario with a baseline value of σ = 9
(row 1). The corresponding figures for the EU are 451,000 or 0.1 percent of the
population. In sum, the Brexit causes migration of about 500,000 individuals. If
migration remains free across UK-EU boundaries, the model predicts that 366,000
individuals would relocate to another region. As the UK experiences a larger welfare
loss than the EU, all relocation takes place across the Channel to settle in the EU.
As the Brexit affects regions heterogeneously, as shown above, an additional 348,000
Europeans change location within the other European countries – which is less than
the corresponding number in the within-scenario. These figures make up 0.58 percent
of the British population and 0.08 percent of the population in the other European
countries. Reducing the elasticity of substitution to σ = 5 raises migration to about
700,000 or by roughly 40 percent with internal migration and to more than one
million migrants in total if we impose a lower elasticity of substitution of σ = 5. In
the latter case, more than 530,000 people or 0.86 percent of the British population
would leave the UK to settle in the rest of Europe.
Turning to the more favorable optimistic scenario where trade costs only increase
by 3.7 percent, overall migration sums up to values between 136,000 (only 14,000
within the UK) and 193,000 (20,000 within the UK) if labor mobility is ruled out
between the UK and the EU. If we relax this assumption, overall migration adds up
to 275,000 in the case of σ = 5 implying an emigration of 142,000 people from the
UK.
25
Table 1.7: Sensitivity: Migration flows
UK EU
Scenario σ in thousands in percent in thousands in percent
Within
Pessimistic
9 52.64 0.08 451.19 0.10
5 75.45 0.12 634.00 0.14
Free
9 366.29 0.58 348.60 0.08
5 537.87 0.86 478.61 0.11
Within
Optimistic
9 14.07 0.02 122.21 0.03
5 20.19 0.03 172.51 0.04
Free
9 97.19 0.15 95.69 0.02
5 142.57 0.23 132.41 0.03
Notes: This table reports the number of migrants in thousands and in percent of the overall
population in the UK and the EU, respectively, as a response to the Brexit. We distinguish two
scenarios (pessimistic and optimistic) and two values for the elasticity of substitution (σ = 9 and
σ = 5). For the optimistic scenario we assume trade costs for EU-UK trade flows to increase
by 3.7 percent; for the pessimistic scenario by 13.9 percent. We further distinguish between mi-
gration Within the UK and the EU and Free migration across all countries. Agglomeration and
congestion elasticities are set to α = 0.1 and β = −0.3.
1.5 Conclusions
This paper has analyzed welfare and migration consequences of European integration
using a quantitative spatial general equilibrium model similar to Allen and Arkolakis
(2014). Based on a unique dataset on inter-regional trade flows in Europe, we
were able to quantify the model for 1,318 European regions in 2010 to study the
heterogeneous effects of trade integration across regions.
If we raise trade costs to a level before the foundation of the European Com-
munity in 1957, welfare declines by about 1-2 percent on average. However, some
remote locations face welfare losses of up to 4 percent. This sets off migration from
the periphery to the center of about 8-11 million people, depending on the specifica-
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tion. We thus conclude that European market integration has contributed to a more
equal distribution of economic activity, that is less density in the core of Europe.
Turning to the present debate of UK’s withdrawal from the European Union,
the Brexit, we find that Scottish regions would expect the largest welfare losses
while the south of England experiences the lowest losses. Since we employ a single-
sector model, welfare losses are moderate with 0.44 percent in the most unfavorable
scenario. Nevertheless, as the UK is affected more severely by the Brexit than the
rest of Europe, free mobility across the Channel could imply emigration of more
than 500,000 people from the UK to settle other parts of Europe. This is equivalent
to nearly one percent of the British population.
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Appendix
1.A European regional trade data
The trade flow matrix comes from the Forecast of Nationwide Transport Relations
in Germany 2030 (Verkehrsverflechtungsprognose 2030, VVP). It covers trade flows
(in metric tons) that either have a German NUTS3-region as origin or destination
or serve as a transit region for intra-European trade of regions outside of Germany.
The data distinguish between the mode of transport, namely road, rail and water,
and product groups according to NST-2007. For rail and water, the data come from
the German Federal Statistical Office and for road from the Federal Motor Transport
Authority (Kraftfahrtbundesamt).
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Table 1.A.1: Aggregate trade volumes per product category: Com-
trade vs. VVP
Between Between Within
Germany - Rest of Europe Rest of Europe Germany
Product category COMTRADE VVP COMTRADE VVP VVP
10 14.57 14.46 106.16 15.29 155.71
21 0.82 0.88 21.80 3.18 29.19
22 0.32 0.87 104.16 0.49 12.45
23 12.79 0.24 98.09 0.14 1.63
31 0.13 1.67 12.98 1.40 15.83
32 0.96 0.52 2.82 0.05 5.60
33 39.53 35.38 93.85 1.85 867.64
40 35.94 24.36 122.19 13.29 279.69
50 1.79 2.81 6.88 3.33 10.60
60 26.02 23.86 78.27 14.10 112.22
71 0.72 1.41 6.68 0.50 10.24
72 17.14 11.05 148.13 5.46 128.10
80 42.65 29.47 131.50 8.18 136.19
90 21.51 20.73 51.11 9.14 280.01
100 29.08 25.20 91.92 15.07 167.88
110 8.70 8.82 24.90 7.88 47.93
120 9.32 12.00 23.18 5.88 68.60
130 1.99 3.16 7.89 1.20 12.00
140 15.42 12.96 42.64 6.82 251.62
150 . 1.29 . 2.38 29.93
160 . 5.59 . 6.06 68.55
170 . 1.27 . 2.98 32.89
180 . 10.66 . 6.99 83.95
190 . 36.82 . 13.65 46.35
Notes: This table reports aggregate trade volumes in million tons per product category. We
compare values that come from COMTRADE with values from the Forecast of Nationwide
Transport Relations in Germany 2030 (VVP).
For German locations trade flows are reported at the NUTS3-level. For other
European countries, geographical units are more aggregated with a higher level of
aggregation for more distant countries. For example, coverage for the Netherlands
occurs at the NUTS2-level while Portugal has no regional breakdown (NUTS0). The
data were collected in a project undertaken by Intraplan Consulting, Munich, in
collaboration with BVU Consulting, Freiburg, for the Federal Ministry of Transport
and Digital Infrastructure and is only available for 2010. The data are made available
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through the Institute for Transport Research of the German Aerospace Center under
http://daten.clearingstelle-verkehr.de/276/.
1.B Data on local GDP and population
As the model requires data on local GDP and population (density) across Euro-
pean regions, we plot this information in two panels of Figure 1.B.1. Darker col-
ors indicate higher values of income and population. The data are taken from
the Statistical Office of the European Union (Eurostat) and can be accessed via
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database. We use information on the gross do-
mestic product (GDP) at current market prices by NUTS 3 regions with the code:
nama_10r_3gdp; on area by NUTS-3 region with the code: demo_r_d3area; and
on the average annual population to calculate regional GDP data (thousand persons)
by NUTS-3 regions with the code: nama_10r_3popgdp.
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Figure 1.B.1: Distribution of GDP per capita and Population density
in 2010
(a) GDP per capita
GDP per capita
1,700 - 7,200
7,300 - 14,500
14,600 - 18,300
18,400 - 20,800
20,900 - 23,400
23,500 - 25,600
25,700 - 28,500
28,600 - 31,500
31,600 - 38,100
38,200 - 162,300
(b) Population density
Population density
0.001 - 0.03
0.03 - 0.05
0.05 - 0.07
0.07 - 0.10
0.10 - 0.13
0.13 - 0.18
0.18 - 0.27
0.27 - 0.50
0.50 - 1.20
>1.20
Notes: This figure plots the quantiles of the GDP per capita distribution in Panel (a) and of the
population density distribution in Panel (b) for the year 2010. A darker shading indicates higher
values.
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Chapter 2
Fiscal redistribution in the spatial
economy
We use a general equilibrium model with fiscal equalization to show that re-
gional transfers are quantitatively important for understanding the spatial
allocation of economic activity. We find that the abolishment of fiscal equal-
ization in Germany would lead to a moderate welfare gain of about 0.33 per-
cent implying migration of about 5 percent of the population in the long run.
The increases in average real GDP per capita and average labor productivity
are more pronounced at 5.8 percent and 9.2 percent, respectively.
2.1 Introduction
Geography is important for the spatial allocation of economic activity. High con-
sumption or production amenities and good access to trade partners (e.g. ports,
railways, and highways) attract both workers and firms. Allen and Arkolakis (2014)
have shown that geography explains between 20-70 percent of the variation in in-
come across space in the US, depending on the choice of parameters. While these
determinants are well understood, we aim at quantifying the importance of govern-
mental activity in a spatial framework. As governments intervene in markets in a
number of ways and for a number of reasons, we restrict governmental activity to
taxation of income, the provision of local public goods, and the redistribution of
resources across regions (fiscal equalization). The mobility response of workers to
governmental intervention is important for local jurisdictions which try to attract
economic resources, but also have to finance the provision of local public goods.
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We build a multi-region general equilibrium model with income taxation, local
public services and inter-regional transfers. A recipient region benefits from receiving
transfers as local governments can raise the provision of local public services. On
the contrary, donor regions experience welfare losses as public resources are not
spent locally. These transfers stimulate labor migration to transfer recipients. At
the aggregate level, we show that the introduction of a fiscal equalization scheme
generally exhibits ambiguous welfare effects in the spatial economy. For example,
higher relative local gross domestic product (GDP) of donors compared to recipients
implies higher welfare gains when fiscal transfers are introduced. This is because a
donor’s transfer of one percent of local GDP translates into a higher relative subsidy
for poorer recipients. In addition, geography matters for overall welfare effects. If
resources are transferred from the core to the periphery, aggregate welfare declines
as one unit of income buys less utility in locations with higher price indexes.
We proceed by assessing the role of fiscal transfers for the spatial allocation
of economic activity and aggregate welfare for Germany. The largest European
economy has established a fairly extensive system of fiscal equalization that raises
financial capacity of some states from less than 50 percent to a level close to the
mean. Using detailed information on inter-regional trade flows, income, population,
tax rates and transfers for 411 districts in Germany in 2010, we show that inter-
jurisdictional redistribution explains up to 31 percent of the spatial variation in
income and is thus quantitatively of major importance for understanding the spatial
economy. Moreover, we find that abolishing fiscal equalization between regions leads
to welfare gains of 0.33 percent in the benchmark specification implying migration
of about 4.6 million individuals or 5.7 percent of the population. The model predicts
that the abolishment of transfers leads to outmigration in former recipient locations
of up to one third of the initial population while former donors expect a pronounced
inflow of migrants.
Our paper relates to a number of literatures. First, our paper adds to a recent
and growing literature that extends quantitative trade models with factor mobil-
ity and exogenous local characteristics (e.g. Allen and Arkolakis, 2014, Bartelme,
2015, Behrens, Mion, Murata, Suedekum, 2017, Caliendo, Parro, Rossi-Hansberg
and Sartre, 2014, Monte, Redding and Rossi-Hansberg, 2015, and Redding, 2016).
Similar to Fajgelbaum, Morales, Suarez Surrato and Zidar (2016), we incorporate
taxation and local public services into this class of models while explicitly allowing
for inter-jurisdictional fiscal equalization. This allows us to quantify the role of fiscal
equalization for the regional variation in welfare and migration.
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Second, we contribute to the public finance literature on fiscal equalization
(Boadway and Flatters, 1982, Watson, 1986), the role of federal taxation for the
spatial allocation of economic activity (Albouy, 2009), and factor mobility in re-
sponse to tax changes (Bartik, 1991, Moretti and Wilson, 2015). We add to this
literature by quantifying a structural model. Albouy (2012) and Tombe and Winter
(2017) undertake a similar exercise to ours for Canada, albeit with a different type
of model.
Third, fiscal equalization can be regarded as one form of place-based policies as
those jurisdictions with high tax income per capita (i.e. high fiscal capacity) are
obliged to transfer resources to locations with lower fiscal capacity. The paper is
therefore related to recent work in this area by Kline and Moretti (2014), Busso,
Gregory and Kline (2013), Ehrlich and Seidel (2016), or Gottlieb and Glaeser (2008).
We deviate from this work by evaluating fiscal equalization as one particular form
of place-based policies.
The paper is organized as follows. We first introduce the model in section 2.2 and
discuss underlying determinants of welfare effects of inter-regional transfers. Section
2.3 quantifies the model for Germany, derives the importance of fiscal equalization
for the spatial allocation of economic activity and analyzes the welfare implications
of abandoning transfers. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 A quantitative geography model with fiscal
equalization
We consider an economy with N regions and L¯ mobile workers. Local governments
collect income taxes to provide public services and reallocate resources across loca-
tions.
2.2.1 Production technologies
Each region i ∈ N produces a unique variety of a differentiated good under perfect
competition and assembles a final good Q(i) from a continuum of varieties according
to a CES-aggregator such that
Q(i) =
[∫
N
q(n, i)σ−1σ dn
] σ
σ−1
. (2.1)
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q(n, i) denotes the quantity of the variety produced in location n and used for
assembly in location i and σ > 1 represents the elasticity of substitution between
varieties. The price of the final good in i is determined by the prices of varieties,
p(n, i), such that
P (i) =
[∫
N
p(n, i)1−σdn
] 1
1−σ
.
The final good is assembled locally at zero cost and not traded. Importantly, Q(i)
can be used by consumers for private consumption C(i) and by local governments
to provide public services G(i). Thus, we have Q(i) = C(i) +G(i).
Varieties require labor as the sole input in the production process and cause costs
of transportation when traded between regions. We follow the standard iceberg
notion such that τ(i, n) ≥ 1 units of a good have to be sent from location i for one
unit to arrive in location n. We set intra-regional trade costs to zero, so τ(i, i) = 1.
Finally, locations may differ with regard to labor productivity A(i).
2.2.2 Taxes, public spending, and fiscal equalization
The public sector taxes labor income to provide public services G(i) and to real-
locate resources across locations. Total tax revenues in region n are then given by
t(i)w(i)L(i), where w(i) describes the wage rate. The tax rate t(i) can be under-
stood as a location-specific average tax rate on local income comprising different
types of taxes. This notion provides sufficient flexibility for the empirical analysis
and follows the observation that local governments possess at least some degree of
tax authority.
Without inter-regional transfers, the public budget constraint is given by G(i) =
t(i)w(i)L(i). Considering fiscal equalization, however, every region either receives
resources from other locations or transfers own income to recipients. We relate these
resources relative to local GDP, so recipients receive θ(i)w(i)L(i) as overall subsidies
where θ(i) > 0 denotes the subsidy rate. For donor regions, θ(i) < 0 so we refer to
it as the transfer rate. Importantly, as overall transfers are related to local GDP,
θ(i) is only equal in absolute terms between donors and recipients if local income
is identical. If, as usual, donors have higher income, a transfer rate of one percent
implies a higher subsidy rate in the destination region as recipients have a lower
per-capita income, are less densely populated or both.
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2.2.3 Preferences
Having introduced the technologies for final good production and public services,
we are ready to turn to the specification of workers’ utility. Individuals in location
i derive utility from publicly provided services, their net real wage income spent on
private consumption, and a location-specific amenity u(i) such that
W (i) = u(i)
[
G(i)
P (i)L(i)η
]γ [
(1− t(i))w(i)
P (i)
]1−γ
. (2.2)
We allow for different degrees of rivalry in the consumption of G(i) governed by
η ∈ [0; 1]. When η = 0, G(i) is a pure public good. When η = 1, G(i)/L(i)
represents per-capita transfers in location i. The parameter γ describes the relative
importance of private consumption and publicly provided services. The amenity
u(i) captures, for example, temperature or scenery, but also house prices (as a
disamenity) or the rate at which local governments transform public spending into
public goods (see Fajgelbaum et al., 2016). Transferring income to another region
decreases welfare of donors through lower provision of public services while recipients
experience higher welfare due to transfers.
Combining individual demand and public demand for the variety from location
i in location n, we obtain aggregate demand
q(i, n) = p(i, n)
−σ
P (n)1−σ E(n),
where E(n) = (1 + θ(n))w(n)L(n) represents the sum of private and public income
including transfers that is available for expenditures in location n.
2.2.4 Profit maximization and inter-regional trade
As each location produces a unique variety of a composite good under perfect compe-
tition, profit-maximizing behavior equates prices to marginal production and trans-
port costs. Consumers in location j have to pay p(i, j) = τ(i, j)w(i)/A(i) for a good
produced in location i where, recall, A(i) denotes location-specific labor productiv-
ity. Combining prices and aggregate demand delivers sales from i to j,
X(i, j) =
(
τ(i, j)w(i)
A(i)P (j)
)1−σ
E(j), (2.3)
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where P (j) is the CES price index:
P (j) =
∫
N
(
τ(n, j)w(n)
A(n)
)1−σ
dn
 11−σ . (2.4)
As long as there is no free trade and productivity of labor is not equalized across
locations, prices will differ.
2.2.5 Agglomeration and dispersion forces
Importantly, both location-specific productivities and amenities depend on the num-
ber of workers in a region. Thus, migration between regions gives rise to externalities
that shape the spatial economy. In particular, we impose that
A(i) = A¯(i)L(i)α (2.5)
and
u(i) = u¯(i)L(i)β (2.6)
Both productivities and amenities contain exogenous components, A¯(i) and u¯(i),
and endogenous parts that are determined by population density in that location.
We restrict parameters to empirically relevant values: α ≥ 0 implies that local
productivity increases in population while β ≤ 0 captures the notion of negative
externalities (e.g. due to congestion).
2.2.6 Equilibrium
We use the following equilibrium conditions to solve the model:
1. Labor market clearing. This requires
∫
N
L(n)dn = L¯ (2.7)
2. Goods market clearing with income transfers. Total labor income in
region i, w(i)L(i), has to equal total sales of region i′s product in all locations
n ∈ N . This delivers
w(i)L(i) =
∫
N
X(i, n)dn, (2.8)
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where X(i, n) accounts for transfers according to (2.3).1
3. Balanced public budget. Each government spends its available budget
entirely on the provision of local public services, so
[t(i) + θ(i)]w(i)L(i) = G(i). (2.9)
Further, total paid transfers have to equal the sum of total received transfers,
so ∫
N
θ(i)w(i)L(i)dn = 0. (2.10)
4. Utility equalization. Free mobility of labor ensures that utility is equalized
across all locations.
We derive a system of equations that allows us to (i) determine exogenous pro-
ductivities and amenities and (ii) solve for endogenous wages and labor allocation
across regions in the counterfactual analysis. First, we combine utility, (2.2), and
bilateral exports, (2.3), with goods-market clearing, (2.8), to get
L(i)1−α(σ−1)w(i)σ =W 1−σA¯(i)σ−1
∫
N
τ(i, n)1−σu¯(n)σ−1Ω(n)σ−1 (2.11)
(1 + θ(n))w(n)σL(n)1+(σ−1)[β+γ(1−η)]dn,
where Ω(n) ≡ (t(n) + θ(n))γ(1− t(n))1−γ. Second, combining utility, (2.2), with the
price index (2.4) delivers
w(i)1−σL(i)(1−σ)[β+γ(1−η)] =W 1−σΩ(i)σ−1u¯(i)σ−1 (2.12)∫
N
τ(n, i)1−σA¯(n)σ−1w(n)1−σL(n)α(σ−1)dn.
Similar to Allen and Arkolakis (2014), we are able to express the above system
of two nonlinear integral equations as one equation providing a direct link between
w(i) and L(i) for each location (see Appendix 2.A for details). We have
W (i)1−σA(i)1−σΩ(i)σ−1w(i)σL(i)1+γ(σ−1)(1−η) = φw(i)1−σu(i)1−σ (2.13)
1Notice that inter-regional transfers imply trade imbalances in equilibrium. Donor regions pro-
duce more than they consume so they run a trade surplus. This phenomenon is well-understood
from the international trade literature (see, e.g., Dekle, Eaton and Kortum, 2007). Total expendi-
tures equal total imports, so E(i) ≡ (1 + θ(i))w(i)L(i) = ∫
N
X(n, i)dn. Comparing this expression
with (2.8) shows that the difference between exports and imports is given by −θ(i)w(i)L(i), while∫
N
(−θ(n)w(n)L(n))dn = 0.
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where φ > 0 is some scalar. Plugging this relationship into (2.12) delivers
L(i)σ˜λ1 =W (i)(1−σ)(1−σ˜)u¯(i)(1−σ˜)(σ−1)A¯(i)σ˜(σ−1)Ω(i)(1−σ˜)(σ−1) (2.14)
×
∫
N
W (n)(1−σ)σ˜τ(n, i)1−σu¯(n)σ˜(σ−1)A¯(n)(1−σ˜)(σ−1)Ω(n)σ˜(σ−1)
(
L(n)σ˜λ1
)λ2
λ1 dn,
where we have defined
λ1 ≡ 1− α(σ − 1)− (β + γ(1− η))σ
λ2 ≡ 1 + ασ + (β + γ(1− η))(σ − 1)
σ˜ ≡ σ − 12σ − 1 .
Using data on tax rates, bilateral trade costs, wages, and population jointly with
the equilibrium conditions allows us to solve the model for exogenous productivities
A¯(i) and amenities u¯(i) up to a constant withW σ−1 as the eigenvalue of the system.
Following Allen and Arkolakis (2014), it can be shown that there is a unique and
stable equilibrium if λ2/λ1 ∈ [−1; 1]. Furthermore, the solution for the equilibrium
distribution of labor can be obtained as the uniform limit of a simple iterative
procedure according to (2.14) if λ2/λ1 ∈ (−1; 1]. For α ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ [−1, 0],
η ∈ [0, 1] and γ ∈ [0, 1], we see that λ2/λ1 ∈ [−1; 1] if and only if α+(β+(1−η)γ) ≤ 0.
Intuitively, migration to location i has to generate a larger reduction in amenity u(i)
than increase in productivity A(i) to ensure that all regions are populated (given γ
and η).
2.2.7 Wages, population and welfare
Combining welfare (2.2) with (2.13) and taking logs yields
λ1lnL(i) = CL + σlnu¯(i) + (σ − 1)lnA¯(i) + σlnΩ(i)− (2σ − 1)lnP (i) (2.15)
λ1lnw(i) = CW − (1− α(σ − 1)) lnu¯(i)− (σ − 1) (β + γ(1− η)) lnA¯(i) (2.16)
− (1− α(σ − 1)) lnΩ(i) + (1 + (σ − 1)(β − α + γ(1− η))) lnP (i),
where the constants CL and CW are determined by the wage normalization and
labor-market clearing. We observe that higher provision of public services (as mea-
sured by Ω) raises population density in that location as long as λ1 > 0. With regard
to wages, the effect of inter-regional transfers is generally ambiguous and depends
on the sign of 1− α(σ − 1).
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While it is immediate from (2.2) that transfers increase (decrease) welfare in
recipient (donor) regions, the aggregate welfare effects of fiscal equalization are less
straightforward. To better understand the driving mechanisms of aggregate welfare,
we design a model economy with 100 locations and study (i) the role of income
disparities between donor and recipient locations and (ii) the role of geography (i.e.
trade costs). For the first exercise, we set trade costs to zero and split the economy
into 50 donors and 50 recipients and impose a general tax rate on income for all
locations. Further, we normalize the population of each region to unity. We then
solve the model with different initial relative wages between donors and recipients.
According to Panel (a) of Figure 2.1, the aggregate welfare gain of introducing a
fiscal equalization scheme is zero if all regions are identical (relative initial GDP
equal to one). This is intuitive as a transfer of one unit of income exerts the same
marginal utility effect in absolute terms if regions are initially identical. Making
donors relatively richer, that is moving right along the horizontal axis, leads to
aggregate welfare gains. In contrast, making recipients richer, that is moving to the
left, yields the opposite effect. As the transfer rate is kept constant, total transfers
make up a larger share of recipients GDP if relative initial local GDP in donor
regions is higher. Taking away one percent of income in rich donor regions raises
expenditure by more than one percent in poorer recipient locations.
Second, we focus on the role of geography and keep relative initial GDP constant
at a ratio of one. We allocate all regions on a line with donors in the center and
recipients in the periphery. Setting trade costs to zero replicates the finding from
Panel (a) that the introduction of a fiscal equalization scheme has no aggregate
welfare implications at the margin. However, raising trade costs leads to higher
price indexes in the periphery compared to the core, so transferring income to the
periphery generates less utility there than in the core. Hence, fiscal equalization
leads to an aggregate welfare loss. Panel (b) of Figure 2.1 illustrates that this effect
gets stronger in the level of trade frictions, albeit at decreasing rates.
2.3 Quantification: Fiscal equalization in Ger-
many
In this section, we bring the model to data, identify underlying parameters and
quantify aggregate effects. Germany runs a pronounced fiscal equalization scheme
and therefore serves as an appropriate candidate for this exercise. We start with
an overview of the institutional setting before introducing the data and discussing
43
Figure 2.1: Aggregate welfare effects of fiscal equalization
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Notes: The Figure illustrates the welfare consequences of introducing a fiscal equalization scheme.
Panel (a) shows the association between the percentage change in welfare and the relative initial
GDP of donors versus recipients. Panel (b) plots the reaction of welfare when trade becomes more
costly and recipient regions are located in the periphery.
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identification. In the counterfactual analysis, we explore aggregate effects when
abandoning the fiscal equalization scheme.
2.3.1 Institutional background
Political power in Germany is divided between the federal government and 16 state
governments (Länder). Each of these authorities is autonomous and independent
with respect to budgetary issues, but at the same time responsible for carrying out
their tasks in an effective way. Each of the 16 state governments has to ensure that
municipalities on its territory are equipped with the necessary financial means.
The federal government, the states, and the municipalities can set certain tax
rates independently and keep (most of) the resulting tax revenues. The most im-
portant taxes with regard to revenue, however, are taxes that are jointly set by the
federal government and the states implying a common tax schedule in all locations.
The resulting revenues are shared between the two layers according to a specific
formula. The most important joint taxes comprise income taxes, corporate taxes,
and the value added tax (VAT). This implies that there is a common VAT rate and
a common income tax schedule across states. As shown in Table 2.1, the latter
accounted for 70.3 percent of overall tax revenues in 2010. The total sum of tax
revenues summed up to 530.6 billion euros or 20.6 percent of GDP.2
Article 72 of the German Constitution postulates that the states have to provide
“equivalent living conditions” in all regions. However, this principle conflicts with
Table 2.1: Tax revenues, 2010
in billion euros in percent
joint 372.9 70.3
federal and tariffs 97.8 18.4
state 12.1 2.3
municipality 47.8 9.0
sum 530.6 100
Source: German Statistical Office (2011).
2See German Statistical Office (2011).
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uniform tax schedules and the fact that economic activity is unevenly distributed
across the country. Based on the prior that all individuals have similar financial
needs, installing equivalent living conditions can only be achieved by redistributing
tax revenues from jurisdictions with higher financial capacity to those with lower
tax revenues per capita.3 This mechanism is referred to as the German Länderfinan-
zausgleich (LFA) - the formula-based federal fiscal equalization scheme. The LFA
takes place in four steps: First, revenues of joint taxes are distributed among the
federal level, the states (as a whole), and the municipalities (vertical distribution).
For example, the federal government and the states receive 42.5 percent of income
taxes each while the remaining 15 percent accrue to municipalities.4 In a second
step, the states’ share of VAT revenue is assigned to each of the 16 states. 75 percent
of the total amount is distributed according to population shares while 25 percent
is dedicated to those jurisdictions with below-average per-capita tax revenues. This
allocation mechanism already exerts a substantial equalizing effect. Comparing
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.2 reveals that Thuringia, for example, climbs from 48.7
percent of average financial capacity (before VAT redistribution) to 88 percent (af-
ter VAT redistribution) while Bavaria’s financial capacity is reduced from 129.3 to
115.6 percent.
Third, states with above-average financial capacity have to redistribute part of
their tax income to those states below average. A progressive schedule ensures a
further convergence to the mean of all 16 states (see Column 4). The fourth step
involves transfers of the federal government to those states whose financial capacity
per inhabitant falls short of 99.5 percent of the average. The respective transfers
close 77.5 percent of this gap.5
Outside of the LFA-system, the federal government has transferred 10.3 billion
euros of special supplementary grants to selected states that face exceptional tasks
like investments in public infrastructure in the new Länder in 2010. Together with
the LFA-transfers, the total sum amounts to about 26.5 billion euros or 5 percent
of the overall tax revenue of Germany. Moreover, each state government runs an
individual transfer scheme to allocate resources between state and municipalities.
In the data section below, we go into more detail on how we have computed the tax
revenue and the available budget for each German district.
3Financial capacity of a state is defined as the sum of its tax revenues plus 64 percent of the
sum of the receipts of that state’s municipalities relative to population.
4See Federal Ministry of Finance (2016) for further details.
5Federal Ministry of Finance (2015).
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Table 2.2: Fiscal redistribution, 2010
Before VAT After VAT After fiscal After general suppl.
redistribution redistribution equalization federal grants
Bavaria 129.3 115.6 105.5 105.5
Baden-Württemberg 117.2 109.5 103.8 103.8
Berlin 88.2 68.1 90.5 97.5
Brandenburg 61.8 90.6 96.3 98.8
Bremen 95.1 74.1 91.9 97.8
Hamburg 157.5 102.1 101.1 101.0
Hesse 127.4 116.0 105.7 105.6
Lower Saxony 85.7 97.6 98.8 99.3
Mecklenburg Western Pomerania 49.0 86.5 95.1 98.5
North Rhine-Westphalia 100.5 98.5 99.2 99.4
Rhineland Palatinate 97.4 95.5 97.8 99.1
Saarland 79.6 94.3 97.4 99.0
Saxony 50.3 88.3 95.6 98.6
Saxony-Anhalt 48.3 88.0 95.5 98.6
Schleswig Holstein 93.4 97.4 98.7 99.3
Thuringia 48.7 88.0 95.5 98.6
Redistribution (in bn. euros) 6.62 7.04 2.62
Source: Federal Ministry of Finance (2015).
2.3.2 Data
Quantifying the model requires data on inter-regional trade flows, tax revenues per
district, the distribution of tax income across regions, and data on population, labor
income, and geographical information. Infrequent availability of inter-regional trade
data restricts us to undertake the quantitative exercise for the year 2010.
Tax data. Information on the collection and distribution of taxes is provided
by the Statistical Office in Germany.6 The general challenge is to assign taxes to
one local jurisdiction as required by the theoretical model although the German tax
system consists of three main layers (federal, state, municipalities). Tax statistics
6The specific statistics are called Fachserie 14-4 (Steuerhaushalt) and Fachserie 14-10 (Reals-
teuervergleich), and Bruttoeinnahmen der Gemeinden (gross income of municipalities).
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follow the latter logic such that information on tax revenues per location is not
readily available.
First, we need to compute average tax rates in location i. As municipalities keep
a certain fraction of value added taxes and income taxes, we are able to infer from
local tax revenues and the distributional share the overall revenue of these taxes.
Other types of taxes like business or property taxes can be taken directly as they
are municipality taxes.7 In sum, these directly assignable taxes make up about 73
percent of overall tax revenues in Germany. Aggregating these taxes at the district
level allows us to compute each district’s revenue share in each state and in Germany
as a whole to assign the remaining state and federal taxes to the local jurisdiction.
Relating each district’s tax revenue to local GDP delivers the average tax rate t(i).
To obtain transfer rates θ(i), we compute tax revenues after redistribution. From
municipalities’ gross income statistics we take tax revenues and transfers received
from other government layers making up about 20 percent of overall tax revenues
in Germany. As we know overall tax revenues after redistribution for both the state
and the federal level, we are able to compute the differences with regard to state and
federal taxes to be allocated. In contrast to the first step above, we now allocate
the remaining taxes according to population shares rather than tax revenue shares.
Relating these numbers at the district level to local GDP yields the average tax rate
after equalization, t(i)+θ(i). Using t(i) from the previous exercise allows us to back
out the transfer rate θ(i) for each region.
Recall, recipients receive θ(i)w(i)L(i) as overall subsidies with θ(i) > 0. For
donor regions, θ(i) < 0 so we refer to it as the transfer rate. In sum, the mechanism
of the LFA relates per-capita transfers to local GDP as illustrated in Figure 2.2.
Districts in East Germany benefit most from fiscal redistribution with per-capita
transfers of more than 3,000 euros per year in some parts. Notice that darker
areas indicate recipients, bright areas donors. Transfers are mainly financed by rich
jurisdictions in West Germany. Frankfurt leads the list with per-capita transfers of
about 11,000 euros. Munich, as another example, pays about 5,700 euros per capita.
Trade data. We use information on trade flows from the Forecast of Nationwide
Transport Relations in Germany 2030 (Verkehrsverflechtungsprognose 2030, hence-
forth VVP) provided by the Clearing House of Transport Data at the Institute of
Transport Research of the German Aerospace Center.8 The data contain bilateral
trade volumes in metric tons between European regions where one German region
7Notice that the business tax has to be shared with the state the municipality is located in.
8The data can be accessed via http://daten.clearingstelle-verkehr.de/276/.
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Figure 2.2: Per-capita transfers (in euros)
Transfers per capita
< -5,000
-5,000 - -2,500
-2,500 - -1,000
-1,000 - 0
0 - 500
500 - 1,000
1,000 - 1,500
1,500 - 2,000
2,000 - 2,500
> 2,500
Notes: Darker areas indicate recipients, bright areas donors.
is either exporter, importer or part of the trade route of the product for the year
2010. To derive the trade elasticity, we restrict the data to Germany. In total we
use trade flows between the 411 German regions.
The data distinguish trade flows by transport mode (road, rail, water), so we
aggregate over modes as we do not focus on differences in this dimension. Further,
the model requires trade values rather than volumes. To convert volumes into values,
we compute unit values from COMTRADE data that are available by product group
at the aggregate national level. We take both a simple average of unit values by
product group (to arrive at the two-digit level) and a weighted average where values
serve as weights. Bilateral distances between regions’ centroids are obtained using
GIS software.
Income and population. Finally, we use data from Eurostat on GDP and
population at the NUTS3-level and the ratio of both as a proxy for wages. We
further normalize wages to have a mean of one without loss of generality.
Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 2.3 illustrate how wages and population relate to the
transfer rate θ. Locations with high per-capita income are net donors, that is θ(i) <
0. Donors are indicated by blue crosses while red circles indicate recipient regions.
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The picture establishes credibility in the plausibility of the computed transfer rate.
More populated locations are on average net donors, whereas small and less densely
populated locations are net recipients of the transfer system. Berlin sticks out as
the location with the largest population. It receives transfers of 5.3 percent of its
local GDP. Importantly, discrepancy between donors and recipients with respect to
population and per-capita income implies that paid transfers are lower relative to
local GDP than received transfers. The average level of θ is -0.03 for donors and
0.07 for recipients.
Figure 2.3: Relationship of wages, population, price index and produc-
tivity with the transfer rate
(a) Wages
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(c) Price index
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(d) Composite productivity
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Notes: Panel (a) links wages to transfer rates θ(i). Panel (b) plots the relationship of population
with the transfer rate θ(i). Panel (c) maps the level of the price index in relation with the transfer
rate. In Panel (d), we have plotted the level of the estimated composite productivity A(i). Notice
that donors have a negative transfer rate θ < 0 and are marked by crosses (in blue). Recipients
are identified by positive transfer rates and are marked by circles (in red).
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2.3.3 Identification and choice of parameters
In this subsection, we uncover bilateral trade costs τ(i, n), exogenous productivi-
ties A¯(i) and exogenous amenities u¯(i) and discuss the choice of additional model
parameters.
Trade costs. We follow the standard procedure in the gravity literature (e.g.
Head and Mayer, 2014) by estimating (2.3) with importer and exporter fixed effects
to control for multilateral resistance. We proxy bilateral trade costs by the Euclidian
distance dist(i, n) between the centroids of locations i and n according to
τ(i, n) = dist(i, n)θ ˜(i, n), (2.17)
where ˜(i, n) is the error term. Log-linearizing (2.3) and substituting for the
parametrization of trade costs yields the following gravity equation for the value
of bilateral trade flows from i to n:
logX(i, n) = δ(i) + γ(n)− (σ − 1)θ log dist(i, n) + (1− σ)β′M+ log (i, n), (2.18)
where δ(i) and γ(n) are exporter and importer fixed effects that control for wages,
productivity, population and the CES price index.9 M collects standard bilateral
control variables from the gravity literature and log (i, n) = (1− σ) log ˜(i, n). Fol-
lowing Lameli, Nitsch, Suedekum, and Wolf (2015) we include a historical dialect
similarity measure and dummy variables for adjacent regions and for regions located
in different federal states.
Table 2.3 summarizes the regression output. Columns 3 to 4 build on bilateral
trade values where the weighting relates to the unit values applied to the raw volume
data. Following Nitsch and Wolf (2013), we also explore results for volumes instead
of values as the dependent variable in Columns 1 and 2. Although this deviates
from the theoretical model, it can be argued that trade values are proportional to
trade volumes so the results are insightful for robustness reasons. Further, exporter
and product-specific dummy variables account for the exporter- and product-specific
price per ton that converts volume of exports into values.
In line with previous results of Lameli, Nitsch, Suedekum, and Wolf (2015) we
find that distance, historical ties (as measured by dialect similarity), contiguity, and
administrative borders affect trade flows between German regions. Cultural and
geographical proximity have positive effects for trade between German regions. Fur-
9As the data distinguish between product groups, we add product fixed effects in the estimation.
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thermore, the volume and value of trade flows falls with distance and administrative
borders. Indeed, the point estimates on log distance range between−0.93 and−1.26.
Moreover, they are statistically significant at the 1-percent level and compare nicely
with standard estimates in the gravity literature. Given the estimated distance elas-
ticity we parameterize trade costs according to τ(i, n)1−σ = dist(i, n)−1.23. We are
confident in this parametrization of trade costs as Head and Mayer (2014) sum-
marize that estimates of the trade-distance elasticity parameter in typical gravity
equations cluster around -1.1 with a standard deviation of 0.41.
Table 2.3: Estimated distance elasticities
volumes values
log(distance) -1.26*** -0.98*** -1.23*** -0.93***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
dialect sim. 0.23*** 0.24***
(0.013) (0.015)
contiguity 0.52*** 0.58***
(0.010) (0.011)
state border -0.46*** -0.46***
(0.005) (0.006)
Exporter FE X X X X
Importer FE X X X X
Product FE X X X X
Constant 3.10*** 3.56*** 17.5*** 18.0***
(0.066) (0.065) (0.079) (0.078)
Observations 1,104,635 1,104,635 853,950 853,950
R2 0.41 0.41 0.70 0.70
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 use the original volume data from VVP.
Columns 3 and 4 are based on trade values where we have used the
simple average of unit values per 2-digit product group. Robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Exogenous amenities and productivities. The values of exogenous pro-
ductivities A¯(i) and amenities u¯(i) represent a second piece of information that is
unobservable from data, but required for quantification of the model. To uncover
these model parameters for 411 districts, we feed estimated trade costs together
with information on population L(i), wages w(i) (proxied by GDP per capita), tax
rates t(i) and transfer rates θ(i) into (2.12) and (2.13) defining a system of 2 × 411
equations in 2 × 411 unknowns. Labor-market clearing pins down the equalized
welfare level in this system.10
10Details on solving for exogenous amenities and productivities are provided in the online ap-
pendix of Allen and Arkolakis (2014).
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Further parameters. We finally need to choose the values of five additional
parameters – α, β, γ, σ and η – to derive values for u¯(i) and A¯(i). We motivate
these values by estimates from the empirical literature. First, we set α = 0.1 as
Rosenthal and Strange (2004) show that productivity increases by up to 8 percent
if population doubles. Second, our chosen value of β = −2/3 is derived as follows.
Allen and Arkolakis (2014) show that their model is isomorphic to models where
households spend a constant income share on housing, δ, such that−β0 = −δ/(1−δ).
According to Eurostat, average expenditure on housing amounted to 24.9 percent
in Germany in 2010 leading to a value of β0 of about one third.11 In addition, β
can be understood to contain locational preferences of workers. If these preferences
are distributed Frechet with shape parameter k = 3 as suggested by Bryan and
Morten (2014), the overall value of β can be written as β = −β0 − 1/θ, where β0
is the baseline congestion elasticity. Third, we need a value for γ governing the
importance of public goods or transfers in the utility function. As the average tax
rate amounts to about 25 percent, we choose γ = 0.25. In sum, these values ensure
stability and uniqueness of the migration equilibrium as α+β+(1−η)γ ≤ 0. Fourth,
the elasticity of substitution σ plays a crucial role for quantifying welfare effects in
trade models. We follow Simonovska and Waugh (2014) in choosing a value of five.
Fifth, we assume that local governments provide pure public goods, so η = 0 in the
baseline. We also study the other extreme of a pure private transfer when η = 1.
Figure 2.4 summarizes the pattern of exogenous productivities (Panel (a)) and
exogenous amenities (Panel (b)). Locations with high per-capita income are charac-
terized by higher values of exogenous productivity, like the south-west of Germany
and bigger cities. Combining this information with location-specific population de-
livers composite productivity A(i) = A¯(i)L(i)α which is also higher in donor regions
(see Panel (c) in Figure 2.3 above). Average labor productivity in donor regions is
twice as high as in recipient locations. Turning to exogenous amenities, we observe
from Panel (b) of Figure 2.4 that donor regions are also characterized by higher levels
in this dimension. Combining these findings with location-specific population size
(see Appendix 2.C.1) modifies this result because densely populated places suffer
from negative congestion externalities. Finally, we observe from Panel (c) of Figure
2.3 that recipients are characterized by higher price indexes on average indicating
that they are more remote than donor regions.
11We use information on the final consumption expenditure of households by consumption
purpose (COICOP 3 digit) from Eurostat with the code: nama_10_co3_p3.
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Figure 2.4: Estimated exogenous productivities and amenities
(a) Exogenous productivities
(b) Exogenous amenities
Notes: This figure plots the exogenous productivity A¯(i) and amenity u¯(i) for α = 0.1, β˜ = −2/3,
γ = 0.25 and η = 0. A darker shading indicates higher values.
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2.3.4 Importance of fiscal equalization
The model allows us to assess the importance of inter-regional transfers for the
variation in local GDP. Combining (2.15) and (2.16) delivers a log-linear relation-
ship between total income in location i and exogenous productivities, exogenous
amenities, the price index and fiscal equalization:
λ1
σ − 1 lnY (i) =
CW + CL
σ − 1 + (1− (β + γ(1− η))) lnA¯(i) + (1 + α) lnu¯(i)
− (2 + α− (β + γ(1− η))) lnP (i) + (1 + α) lnΩ(i). (2.19)
We apply a Shapley decomposition to (2.19) in order to determine the combined
contribution of fiscal equalization (Ω) to the spatial dispersion of income. Figure 2.5
reports the fraction of the spatial variation in income that is due to fiscal equalization
rather than local characteristics or geographical location (that is P ). For our baseline
values γ = 0.25 and η = 0, we report the results of the decomposition for all
combinations of α ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ [−1, 0] with a stable and unique equilibrium.
The decomposition suggests that at least 13 percent of the observed spatial
variation in income is due to fiscal equalization. When the spillovers are such that
α = 0.71 and β = −0.97 fiscal equalization may account for up to 31 percent of the
observed variation in income. In sum, the results indicate that the fiscal equalization
scheme in Germany is important for the spatial variation in incomes across regions.
Geographical location, in contrast, explains only a minor fraction of spatial income
variation.
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Figure 2.5: Fraction of Spatial Variation in Income due to Fiscal
Equalization in Germany
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Notes: This figure shows the fraction of the observed variation in income across regions in Germany
in 2010 that is due to fiscal equalization. For γ = 0.25 and η = 0 we calculated the results of
the decomposition for all combinations of α ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ [−1, 0] with a stable and unique
equilibrium.
2.3.5 Abolishing the redistribution scheme
To assess aggregate effects of fiscal equalization, we run a counterfactual scenario
where we set the transfer rates to zero in all regions, so θ(i) = 0 for all i ∈ N ,
and compare the counterfactual equilibrium values of the model with those of the
baseline scenario. On average, abandoning fiscal equalization leads to a welfare gain
of 0.33 percent in this model. The data feature a significant dispersion of income
between donors and recipients, so we should expect negative aggregate welfare effects
from abandoning inter-regional transfers according to this channel. Recall that a
transfer of one percent of income from a rich location implies a subsidy of more
than one percent in a poorer location. However, we have also observed from Panel
(c) of Figure 2.3 that recipient regions are on average more remote as indicated by
a higher price index. Transferring money “back” from the periphery to the core
56
works towards aggregate welfare gains in the model. The estimated positive welfare
effect of abandoning the fiscal equalization scheme therefore suggests that geography
dominates the effect of income dispersion between donors and recipients.
Figure 2.6: Changes in local public services, real wages and population
(a) Local public services
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(b) Real wages
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(c) Population
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Notes: Panel (a.) shows the association between changes in local public services and the transfer
rate θ. Panel (b.) plots the relationship of changes in real wages and the transfer rate θ. Panel
(c.) presents the relationship of population changes and the transfer rate θ. Net donors have a
negative transfer rate θ and are marked by x (in blue). Net recipients observe positive transfer
rates and are marked by circles (in red).
We explore the components of the welfare function more closely by reformulating
(2.2):
W (i) = u¯(i)Ω(i)w(i)
P (i)L(i)
β+γ(1−η). (2′)
Abandoning transfers exerts a direct impact via Ω(i) that is decreasing for recipients
and increasing for donors. This effect is illustrated in Panel (a) of Figure 2.6. As
welfare has to be equalized in a spatial equilibrium, individuals migrate to previous
donor regions. This changes the relative supply of goods and the spatial distribution
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of income in the economy. To ensure goods-market clearing, prices need to fall in
regions that experience immigration. This takes place via lower nominal wages and
higher labor productivity A(i). As geography matters, however, real wages do not
decline in all former donor regions. Those locations with a low negative transfer rate
benefit from the overall decline in the price index, so their real wage increases. The
real wage increase even compensates the negative effect of abandoning transfers for
some former recipient regions with a low positive transfer rate, so those regions even
experience immigration. This is evident from Panel (c) of Figure 2.6. The model
predicts a very large inflow of individuals in Frankfurt/Main of more than 50 percent
in the long run. The city is the largest contributor to the fiscal equalization scheme
and also located in the center of Germany. Hence, both a high relative gain in public
services and a low price index explain the pronounced increase in attractiveness of
this location.
Geographically, migration would take place from East German and less densely
populated regions to highly agglomerated regions in the western and southern parts
of the country (see Figure 2.7). Locations in East Germany experience the largest
decline in population of more than one third. In contrast, wealthy and densely
populated areas in the west and south of Germany experience the largest migration
inflows. At the aggregate level, abandoning fiscal transfers stimulates migration of
4.6 million individuals or 5.7 percent of the German population.
We have discussed in section 2.2 that shocks lead to new equilibria if dispersion
forces are stronger than agglomeration forces. Hence, amenities decline substantially
in locations that experience an increase in population. These amenities are difficult
to grasp, so the public debate on regional transfers centers around the distribution
of income, mostly only in nominal terms. Our counterfactual analysis informs this
debate as we can derive changes in average real wages and average (labor) produc-
tivity. As is evident from Panel (b) of Figure 2.6, abandoning regional transfers
would contribute to a reduction in the dispersion of real wages. Furthermore, the
model predicts that real wages increase by about 5.75 percent. The aggregate effect
is mainly driven by the relocation of workers from sparsely populated peripheral re-
gions with low productivity to densely populated districts with higher productivity.
This reallocation increases average productivity by 9.2 percent.
Public goods versus per-capita transfers. So far, we largely ignored the role
of η in our model. Recall that η governs the rivalry of public services in consumption.
In the baseline scenario, we assumed public services to be pure local public goods,
so η = 0. In this case, we observe from (2′) that local welfare is increasing in pop-
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Figure 2.7: Geographical relocation of labor
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Notes: This figure plots the percentage change in population after abandoning the redistribution
scheme.
ulation. Intuitively, a larger market allows higher per-capita consumption of public
services when there is no rivalry in consumption. This establishes an additional
agglomeration force.
Table 2.4 summarizes aggregate effects of welfare, average real wages, average
(labor) productivity and migration in absolute and relative terms. We observe that
for η = 1 aggregate welfare effects become negative (-0.21 percent) when we abolish
fiscal equalization payments. Intuitively, welfare has to be smaller in the case of
per-capita transfers because resources are re-directed to more populous districts in
our application. With η = 0, this generates an additional advantage compared to
the case of η = 1. Consequently, inter-regional migration flows are less pronounced.
Weight of public services. Another important parameter is the Cobb-Douglas
parameter γ governing the importance of public services in the utility function. Ta-
ble 2.4 reveals that higher values of γ are associated with higher or less negative
welfare changes. Intuitively, γ affects the strength of agglomeration forces. If in-
dividuals value public services more, transferring income leads to more pronounced
responses in labor mobility. If population size matters in addition, so η = 0, then
changes in γ exert an even stronger effect on aggregate outcome.
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Table 2.4: Aggregate Effects: Welfare, real wages, labor productiv-
ity and migration
η γ
Wˆ ŵ/P Aˆ Lˆ Lˆ
(in percent) (in percent) (in percent) (in millions) (in percent)
0 0.20 0.07 4.17 6.57 3.38 4.14
0 0.25 0.33 5.75 9.21 4.64 5.67
0 0.30 0.77 7.89 12.57 6.15 7.53
1 0.20 -0.23 3.10 4.81 2.51 3.07
1 0.25 -0.21 3.86 6.08 3.14 3.84
1 0.30 -0.15 4.65 7.39 3.77 4.61
Notes: This table reports changes in welfare, average real wages, labor productivity and mi-
gration (in millions and in percent of the total population) for σ = 5, α = 0.1, β = −0.66 and
different parameter values of η when income redistribution between locations is abolished.
2.4 Conclusions
We have argued in this paper that it is important to account for fiscal transfers
between jurisdictions to understand the spatial organization of an economy. We use
a general equilibrium model with trade and labor mobility to derive insights about
the welfare costs about fiscal equalization. We argue that transfers from rich to poor
regions raises welfare as a transfer of one percent of income in donor regions makes
up more than one percent in target regions. This effect rises in the dispersion of
income. Further, geography matters. If recipients are located in the periphery, one
unit of income buys less utility there due to a higher price index.
We quantify the model for Germany with data on population, income and inter-
regional trade and explore aggregate effects by abolishing the fiscal equalization
scheme. We find moderate welfare effects of 0.33 percent indicating that geography
plays an important role. About 5 percent of the population would change their place
of residence and employment to reinstall a spatial equilibrium.
As migration changes the spatial allocation of production as well as local con-
sumption and production amenities, we find that the abolishment of transfers raises
average real per-capita income by 5.8 percent in the long run, which is largely driven
by an increase in average labor productivity of more than 9 percent. Overall, re-
gional transfers are able to explain up to about 30 percent of the variation in local
income.
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Appendix
2.A Derivation of (2.13)
To derive (2.13), we define
λ(i) ≡ (1 + θ(i))A¯(i)
1−σw(i)σL(i)1−α(σ−1)
Ω(i)1−σu¯(i)1−σw(i)1−σL(i)(1−σ)[β+γ(1−η)] .
Assuming symmetric trade costs, τ(i, n) = τ(n, i), we get from (2.11) and (2.12):
λ(i)
1 + θ(i) =
∫
N τ(i, n)1−σu¯(n)σ−1Ω(n)σ−1 (1 + θ(n))w(n)σL(n)1+(σ−1)(β+γ(1−η))dn∫
N τ(n, i)1−σA¯(n)σ−1w(n)1−σL(n)α(σ−1)
=
∫
N λ(n)βF (n, i)dn∫
N λ(n)β−1F (n, i)dn
,
where F (n, i) ≡ τ(n, i)1−σu¯(n)(1−β)(σ−1)A¯(n)β(σ−1)Ω(n)(σ−1)(1−β)(1 + θ(n))1−β
w(n)σ+β(1−2σ)L(n)1+β(σ−1)+β((α−β)(σ−1)−1)+(1−β)γ(σ−1)(1−η).
Rearranging terms delivers
λ(i)β
λ(i)β−1 = (1 + θ(i))
∫
N F (n, i)λ(n)βdn∫
N F (n, i)λ(n)β−1dn
.
Following the logic in Allen and Arkolakis (2014) and referring to the generalized
Jentzsch theorem, λ(i)β = (1 + θ(i))φλ(i)β−1 and thus λ(i)/(1 + θ(i)) = φ. Plugging
this relationship into the definition of λ(i) above yields (2.13).
2.B Data
To compile the tax data, we first subtract an amount of 37,895.9 million euros that
is primarily used for child allowance. This is the standard procedure in the fiscal
equalization scheme and appropriate in our context as this item is a main transfer
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for families. As a consequence, overall tax income in 2006 of 526,218.2 million
euros shrinks to 488,775.3 million euros. In the following, we describe in detail
how we obtain the two key tax variables of interest. First, we need to know how
much tax revenue each district has generated in 2010. Second, we compute each
district’s share of the overall tax budget. These data are not readily available as
Germany is characterized by several jurisdictional layers that have both common
and individual tax authority. Therefore, tax statistics provide information on tax
income for different types of taxes and different jurisdictional entities. As our model
abstracts from these layers (and the complexity of different types of taxes), we need
to assign tax income to each district.
First, we calculate tax income generated in each district. Using the statistic
“Realsteuervergleich” from the German Statistical Office, we obtain information on
business and property tax revenues that can be directly linked to each location.
Further, we can derive total revenues of VAT and income taxes collected in each
district. For this, we take advantage of the fact that municipalities can keep a certain
fraction of the total that is fixed at a certain rate for every jurisdiction. As we know
the total amount each district can keep, we can infer the total amount collected.
VAT and income taxes are the two most important taxes with regard to revenues
accounting for about 61 percent of total tax income in Germany. Together with
business and property taxes, the share rises to 70 percent that can be unambiguously
assigned to each locality. The remaining 30 percent of tax income comprises federal
and state taxes that we assign to each district according to the share of tax income
that is directly attributable to each location. This follows the idea that districts with
higher VAT and income tax revenue are characterized by higher economic activity
leading to higher revenues of other taxes as well.
Second, we compute the tax budget of each district. This figure does not neces-
sarily match the previous figure on collected taxes at the local level, as major taxes
are shared between different layers of government and, most importantly, there is
inter-regional redistribution. From the German Statical Office’s “Bruttoeinnahmen
der Gemeinden”, we know each location’s tax budget plus transfers from the state
or the federal level. As Germany is characterized by an elaborate federal system
where municipalities, states, and the federal level itself are responsible for certain
tasks that are fixed by the constitution. Hence, these layers have a claim for a
certain share of the overall tax budget. Therefore, tax statistics do only report tax
budgets for each layer and we need to distribute the state and federal budgets to
each district.
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We have shown in the main part of this paper that a substantial amount of
resources is transferred between the federal level and the states and between the
states. We thus use information about the available tax budget of each state after
fiscal equalization. These budgets differ substantially from collected taxes. We then
need to make an assumption about how these state budgets are distributed across
each state’s districts (municipalities). To capture the idea that the state is obliged
to install equal living conditions across regions, we distribute these tax budgets
according to population shares (rather than tax income shares). What remains is
the federal tax budget that we also distribute according to population shares.
Having completed these two tasks delivers two variables: Total tax income of each
district before equalization and total tax income of each district after equalization.
The difference defines transfers each district pays or receives. Relating these data
to local GDP delivers the transfer rate θ(i).
Table 2.B.1 shows the volume of redistribution at each stage of the process. In
sum, this amounts to about 26.5 billion euros or 5 percent of tax revenues.
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2.C Composite productivities and amenities
Figure 2.C.1: Estimated composite productivities and amenities
(a) Composite productivities
(b) Composite amenities
Notes: This figure shows composite productivity A(i) and composite amenity u(i) for α = 0.1,
β˜ = −2/3, γ = 0.25 and η = 0. A darker shading indicates higher values.
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2.D GDP per capita and population density
Figure 2.D.1: Distribution of GDP per capita and population density
in 2010
(a) GDP per capita
GDP per capita
13,135 - 18,683
18,684 - 20,340
20,341 - 22,823
22,824 - 24,435
24,436 - 25,939
25,940 - 28,236
28,237 - 30,393
30,394 - 34,823
34,824 - 44,865
44,866 - 106,936
(b) Population
Population
34,023 - 70,551
70,552 - 93,806
93,807 - 110,110
110,120 - 126,630
126,640 - 139,920
139,930 - 171,210
171,220 - 204,910
204,920 - 258,480
258,490 - 343,530
343,540 - 3,447,000
Notes: This figure plots the quantiles of the GDP per capita distribution in Panel (a) and of the
population distribution in Panel (b) for the year 2010. A darker shading indicates higher values.
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Chapter 3
Decomposing the role of
urbanization in wage inequality in
Germany: Unequal pay in cities?
I identify the role of urbanization in the development of wage inequality in
Germany between 1985 and 2009. Urbanization contributes about 30 per-
cent to the growth of overall wage inequality. To understand the underlying
channels of this location-inequality premium, I construct counterfactuals that
simulate the evolution of wage distributions with (i) a constant (as of 1985)
spatial distribution of skills or (ii) an equal change in the relative remuner-
ation for skills across locations of different population densities. The largest
part of the location-inequality premium is due to an increasingly unequal pay
of workers with an initially high within-group inequality in larger cities com-
pared to smaller cities. An increased sorting of employees on the basis of their
observable skills did not contribute to the increase in wage inequality. Up to
half of the location-inequality premium is due to the occupational structure or
job task content, about 30 percent is due to firm size, and about 25 percent is
due to the industrial structure.
3.1 Introduction
Seek the welfare of the city and you will prosper. More than 50 percent of the
worldwide population follows this rule and lives in cities. This figure will increase
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to 66 percent by 2050, according to the United Nations (2014). The economic
literature suggests that this trend is promising, as cities make people and firms
more productive (see, for example, Rosenthal and Strange, 2004, and Puga, 2010
for reviews). One interesting implication of urbanization that we know little about
is its relationship with wage inequality. Does increasing urbanization broaden or
widen the wage disparity among workers? Recent work by Baum-Snow and Pavan
(2013) documents that urbanization increases the wage gap between workers. The
surge of wage inequality in larger cities explains at least a quarter of the increase
in wage inequality in the United States (US) between 1979 and 2007. It is unclear,
however, whether a similar link between location size and inequality exists even
under different conditions. If yes, which channels affect this relationship?
This paper has two goals. First, I explore the link between urbanization and wage
inequality by using administrative data from (West) Germany. This is interesting as
Germany differs from the US in important ways. For example, workers in Germany
are far less mobile across regions and a fiscal redistribution scheme mitigates spatial
inequality. Locations not only differ in their workers’ productivity levels in producing
goods and services but also vary in their industrial, functional, and skill composition.
Second, I study the relative importance of worker- and firm-specific dimensions—like
the distribution of firm size, occupational structure, and job tasks—that describe
the composition of cities more precisely.
Figure 3.1 documents the increased importance of location size for wage inequal-
ity in (West) Germany between 1985 and 2009. In 1985, the variance in wages was
smaller, and the relationship between location size and wage inequality lower than
in 2009. But the variance increased over time with a higher growth in larger urban,
densely populated locations (T = 1, ..., 7) than in rural, less densely populated areas
(T = 0).
Behrens and Robert-Nicoud (2015) provide a discussion on the different ways
location size influences wage inequality. In short, the effect of location size is the
joint outcome of differences in the composition of cities and relative remuneration of
skills across locations. For example, workers who are generally paid unequally—that
is, workers with a higher within-group inequality—sort into larger cities whereas ho-
mogeneous groups reside in small, rural locations. Besides sorting, one can imagine
that the skill heterogeneity increased in large cities. So, a change in the relative
remuneration of skills translates to higher inequality there.1
1See, for example, Behrens and Robert-Nicoud (2014), and Eeckhout, Pinheiro, and Schmid-
heiny (2014).
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Figure 3.1: Wage Inequality by Location Size, 1985–2009
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Source: SIAB sample for full-time workers between 21 and 60 years of age.
Notes: The figure plots the variance in log (real) wages in (West) Germany against
an increasing index of location size for each time period—1985, 2001, and 2009.
To identify the existence of a location-inequality premium and to quantify the
importance of the underlying channels, I construct counterfactual distributions that
retain the composition of observable skills as well as relative remuneration at a
reference level. This allows me to decompose the change in wage inequality into
two parts: (i) a composition effect, which represents the distribution and sorting of
workers across locations, and (ii) a price effect, which describes divergent changes
in remuneration across space.2
A comparison of the actual change in wage inequality with the counterfactual
change identifies a location-inequality premium. I find that location size has con-
tributed to the rise in wage inequality by about 25–31 percent, depending on the
specification. This effect varies across the wage distribution with large positive
effects for high-wage workers. Workers at the upper part of the distribution are
increasingly paid unequally in larger, more densely populated locations compared
to smaller, less densely populated locations.
The results show that differences in skill composition and the subsequent sorting
of workers across locations are not important for the increase in wage inequality since
the mid-1980s. Instead, variations in the remuneration for skill explain the largest
2See Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo (2011) for a review of decomposition methods in economics.
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part of the location-inequality premium. But it is unclear which channels affect this
relationship. To get a better understanding of this link, I determine how much
of the higher increase of within-group inequality in larger locations results from a
finer depiction of the composition of cities and consider additional observable worker
and firm characteristics. In particular, in addition to industry structure, I examine
the distribution of firm size, occupational structure, and job tasks. I include these
additional direct measures of skill, as the returns to skill vary across occupations or
the task content of jobs.3 The distribution in firm size accounts for the fact that
larger and more productive firms pay higher wages on average.
The decomposition shows that worker characteristics are more important than
firm characteristics for the location-inequality premium. Up to one-half of the effect
occurs because occupations or job tasks with a greater increase in wage inequality
are more concentrated in larger locations. Firm size explains around one-third, while
differences in the industry composition only account for around one-fourth of the
location-inequality premium. Sorting of workers within those groups across locations
only explains a small part. In sum, groups of workers with an initial unequal pay in
the mid-1980s today face even higher inequality in larger cities compared to smaller
cities. Thus, urbanization boosts higher within-group inequality and contributes
to greater inequality especially among high-skilled workers in Germany. This is
important as it shows that location size affects the distribution of wages differently
for similar workers. Cities pay their workers unequally.
The paper is related to recent findings in urban economics on wage inequal-
ity. The regional and urban economics literature—including the work of Glaeser,
Resseger, and Tobio (2009), Behrens and Robert-Nicoud (2014), la Roca and Puga
(2015), Davis and Dingel (2012), Lindley and Machin (2014), and Eeckhout et al.
(2014)—examines agglomeration economies, tougher selection of entrepreneurs and
firms, and skill composition across locations to explain the higher productivity in
cities. A greater skill bias of agglomeration economies and change in the relative sup-
ply of skilled versus unskilled labor induces higher inequality in cities. Within this
line of research, Baum-Snow and Pavan (2013) develop a decomposition method to
determine the fraction of the increase in wage inequality that is due to differences in
the composition of cities and relative remuneration for skills across locations. Baum-
Snow and Pavan (2013) account for different industrial structures across cities. This
makes sense as larger cities employ more high-skilled workers in high-wage indus-
3See, for example, Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux, and Parent (2005), who show that the returns to
skill are higher in occupations that employ workers with higher skill levels.
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tries.4 But the composition of locations and its relationship with location size dif-
fer not only in terms of their industrial structure. The literature documents that
workers performing non-routine and cognitive routine tasks earn more than their
colleagues with manual routine and manual non-routine tasks. Bacolod, Blum, and
Strange (2009), for example, find for the US that the composition of cognitive and
non-cognitive skills is similar across locations of various sizes, but that the returns
for soft skills and some more technical skills are larger in bigger cities. To account
for this, I consider a more precise depiction of the composition of cities and explore
the importance of other aspects, like changes in the occupational structure or the
task content of jobs.
Finally, this study is also related to the empirical labor economics literature
that has examined the relative importance of worker and firm characteristics for
overall wage inequality. In their empirical study for Germany, Card, Heining, and
Kline (2013) report an increased importance of worker heterogeneity at the firm
level. Assortative matching between workers and firms leads to firm-specific wage
premiums. High-skilled individuals work more often in high-skilled occupations
and high-wage firms than less-skilled workers. The increased concentration of high-
skilled workers contributes to skill and consequently to wage inequality across firms.
However, Card et al. (2013) do not specify which firm characteristics are important
to explain the change in wage inequality, and do not relate it to urbanization and
the characteristics of the location of work. Recent theories of firm heterogeneity
explain residual inequality through the wage differentials between firms—including
the theories of Combes, Duranton, Gobillon, Puga, and Roux (2012) and Behrens,
Duranton, and Robert-Nicoud (2014).5 Tougher firm selection and sorting of more
productive firms into larger, high-density markets emanate in a wider distribution
of firm productivities. This helps to explain bigger residual wage inequality, as
the more productive firms pay higher wages on average. In a more recent study
Dauth, Findeisen, Moretti, and Suedekum (2016) show that worker-firm matching
in denser local labour markets is indeed a key driver of higher wages in cities.
To highlight the importance of this dimension, I account for the heterogeneous
firm size distribution and compare workers across different firm size groups. Ehrl
(2016) also finds that occupational attributes turn out to be the most important
wage determinant. Ehrl (2016) follows a regression-based decomposition method
to decompose wage inequality in Germany into region-, worker-, firm-, and sector-
4See, for example, Davis and Dingel (2014).
5See Akerman, Helpman, Itskhoki, Muendler, and Redding (2013) for a short summary of the
literature on firm heterogeneity and wage inequality.
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specific components. In this paper, however, I have a narrower focus by attempting
to isolate the role of location size or density and the underlying channels for the
location-inequality premium.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 provides an introduction to
the development of wage inequality in Germany. Section 3.3 discusses the underlying
method to analyze changes in the (West) German wage structure between 1985 and
2009. In Section 3.4, I introduce the data. Section 3.5 presents the results and
alternative specifications, including the role of firm size, occupations, and industry
structure, before I conclude in Section 3.6.
3.2 Wage inequality in Germany
Wage inequality increased from 1985 to 2009 in (West) Germany. This trend is
already well documented in previous empirical findings on the German labor mar-
ket. For descriptions of the recent developments, see, for example, Dustmann et al.
(2009), Dustmann, Fitzenberger, Schoenberg, and Spitz-Oener (2014), and Card et
al. (2013).
Table 3.1 presents different inequality statistics for full-time employed German
males between 21 to 60 years of age. I report inequality statistics for the time
periods from 1985 to 2001 and 1985 to 2009.6 Panel (a) displays the numbers for
each year. Panel (b) presents the corresponding changes over time. These changes
will provide the benchmark against which I will compare counterfactual changes in
wage inequality later in the analysis (explained below).
First, I compute the mean wages for groups of workers with the same observ-
able characteristics and the corresponding individual deviation from the mean. To
differentiate between groups of workers, I control for worker- and region-specific fac-
tors. Specifically, I condition on age, education, and the population density of the
workplace district. Then I compare several inequality statistics between and within
those groups of workers.
Between 1985 and 2009, the variance in total wages increased by 0.067 log
points—that is, 70 percent (Column 1). These changes will provide the benchmark
against which I will compare counterfactual changes in wage inequality later in the
analysis (explained below). Both between and within groups of workers, inequality
increased over time (see Columns 4 and 5). The increase in wage inequality, how-
6I abstract from the time period between 1985 and 1993, as only minor changes took place.
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ever, differs across the wage distribution. To highlight the difference between the
lower and upper parts of the wage distribution, I also present the 85–50 percentile
gap and the 50–15 percentile gap. The underlying data set requires computing the
gap between the 85th and 50th percentiles, and the gap between the 50th and 15th
percentiles, because wages are censored at the top of the distribution.
Within groups of workers with similar observable characteristics, the (residual)
variance in wages experienced a higher increase than between groups of workers. The
variance in residual wages increased by 0.048 log points—that is 71 percent (column
5). One interesting development stands out: The increase in residual inequality
was more pronounced in the lower part of the distribution. The 50–15 percentile
gap in residual wages increased more than the 85–50 percentile gap. The 85–50
percentile gap rose by 0.111 log points, or 28 percent (Column 2), and the 50–15
percentile gap by 0.133 log points, or 50 percent (Column 3) between 1985 and
2009. This is interesting, as the opposite was found for the US by Autor, Katz, and
Kearney (2008). Hence, in the US, high-wage workers at the top of the distribution
experienced relatively higher real wage increases compared to workers in the middle
and the lower parts of the distribution. But in (West) Germany, wage inequality
increased especially in the lower part of the wage distribution.
Some specialties about the development of the German labor market might help
to differentiate between the US and Germany. In the first half of the 1990s, the
economic situation of Germany deteriorated and the unemployment rate increased
to around 10 percent. In subsequent years, the wage-bargaining system started to
decentralize. Wage bargaining shifted from the industry level to the level of the single
firm or worker. This process initiated a decline in wages, especially at the bottom
of the wage distribution. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the unemployment rate,
however, was still at around 10 percent. As a consequence, the “Hartz” reforms
were initiated between 2002 and 2005. These reforms led to institutional changes
and to a liberalization of the labor market. These developments were especially
important for the development at the bottom of the wage distribution. Higher
demand for high-skilled workers, due to technological change, international trade,
and an increased importance of specific knowledge raised wage inequality between
(skill) groups, especially at the top of the distribution.
The specific role of urbanization in wage inequality in Germany, however, has
not been empirically analyzed so far. In the following, I try to fill this gap.
76
Table 3.1: Trends in log-wage inequality
Total Between Residual
Year Variance 85–50 Gap 50–15 Gap Variance Variance 85–50 Gap 50–15 Gap N
Panel (a)
1985 0.096 0.394 0.266 0.028 0.068 0.248 0.237 566,130
2001 0.125 0.440 0.321 0.033 0.092 0.275 0.286 571,051
2009 0.163 0.504 0.399 0.047 0.116 0.307 0.346 533,767
Panel (b)
1985 to 2001 0.029 0.047 0.055 0.005 0.024 0.028 0.049 566,130
1985 to 2009 0.067 0.111 0.133 0.019 0.048 0.059 0.108 533,767
Source: SIAB sample for full-time working men between 21 and 60 years of age.
Notes: Panel (a) reports the variance and percentile gaps of the overall, between, and residual log real wage distributions for
each time period. The residuals are obtained as individual deviations from the group means (conditional on age, education, and
location size). Changes over time in Panel (b) represent benchmarks against which counterfactual changes absent in location
size effects will be compared.
3.3 Methodology
To analyze the effect of location size on the development of wage inequality, I apply
the procedure proposed by Baum-Snow and Pavan (2013). First, I assess the role
of the composition of observable skills and relative remuneration across locations.
For that, I apply the “cell-by-cell” nonparametric re-weighting method of DiNardo,
Fortin, and Lemieux (1996), and Lemieux (2006). Then I combine the re-weighting
procedure with the change-in-changes (CIC) method of Athey and Imbens (2006)
to analyze growth in residual inequality. Finally, I extend the analysis of Baum-
Snow and Pavan (2013), and employ a wide range of additional regression-based
decompositions. The aim is to disentangle various worker- and firm-specific factors
that contribute to the location-inequality premium. The following subsections discuss
the fundamental idea behind the method, the empirical problems, and the identifying
assumptions.
3.3.1 Set-up
A vector of observable characteristics G = x interacts with a vector of location size
T to form a mutually exclusive group for each worker i. I use a combination of
three education and eight age groups to form 24 skill groups, x. T is an increasing
index of the location size of the workplace district. Each worker i with observable
characteristics G in location group T earns a (log) wage yit(G, T ) at time t:
yit(G, T ) = mt(G, T ) + it(G, T ). (3.1)
77
The wage structure is linear and additively separable. This allows me to separate
contributions of observables (G, T ) from that of unobservables . The wage is a
function of the mean wage mt(G, T ) and the individual deviation from the mean
it(G, T ). I construct the residuals  to have a zero mean conditional on the observ-
ables (G, T ). The zero conditional mean assumption ensures that only observable
components influence mean wages. Furthermore, I assume strict monotonicity in .
This ensures a mapping of individual unobserved characteristics to the outcome y.
I integrate all individual information over skill and location size groups. This gives
me the corresponding distribution function for residual or total log wages:
Ft(y) =
∫
Ft(y|G, T )Ft(G, T )dGdT. (3.2)
Ft(y|G, T ) represents the conditional distribution of wages observed across space
T . The joint cumulative distribution function (CDF) of observable characteristics
Ft(G, T ) represents the skill composition of the workforce. It consists of two parts:
Ft(G, T ) = Fat(T |G)Fbt(G) (3.3)
The first function—the CDF conditional on skill groups Fat(T |G)—accounts for
the sorting of workers across locations T on their observable characteristics G.
In technical terms, it represents the probability of an individual with observable
skills G to work in a location of size T . To deal with the sorting of workers across
locations on the basis of their observable skills, I assume that the probability of
being located in T does not vary for workers within the same skill group G. The
second function—the marginal or unconditional probability density function (pdf)
Fbt(G)—accounts for the overall development of observable skills across time. First,
it describes the change in the demographic composition of the workforce over time.
This is important, as the share of old workers increased, whereas the share of the
youngest cohort declined drastically over the last decades. Second, it depicts the
increase in the overall education level of the workforce over time, that is the general
increase in high-skilled workers relative to low-skilled workers.
Identification. Two main problems complicate the identification of a causal
relationship between location size and wage inequality. The first problem is a miss-
ing random source in the variation of location size. The second problem arises due
to selective sorting of workers on unobservable characteristics  (for example, un-
observed ability, effort, or skills) into location size groups T . In technical terms,
unobservables may differ across location size groups T with the same observables
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G, and some part of those unobservables that influence the outcome y may be cor-
related with T .7 For example, the positive sorting of high-ability and low-ability
workers into larger locations may lead to an upward bias of the location-inequality
premium.
The challenges of no exogenous source of variation in T and potential selection
bias indicate the need to impose two identifying assumptions. First, the assumption
of common support demands for each [G′, ′]′ in the total set of observables and
unobservables G×  a nonnegative probability of this combination across space, 0 <
Pr[T = s|G = x,  = e] < 1. This ensures that all values of G and  can be compared
across all location size groups T . Second, the assumption of unconfoundedness rules
out the problem of selective sorting or any other potential endogeneity of covariates.
Here, I implicitly assume that the distribution of unobservables is the same across
groups T , conditional on observables T⊥|G. This amounts to the assumption that,
conditional on G, the relationship between T and  is identical for each worker. At
this stage, it is important to note that the primary goal of the study is not to identify
a causal effect. I construct counterfactuals to single out the potential direction of
the location-inequality premium. The results should then serve as a benchmark for
further investigations.
3.3.2 Counterfactuals
The assumptions of common support and unconfoundedness allow me to re-weight
the full composition of observable characteristics and to identify counterfactuals.
Counterfactuals represent situations without a shift in relative remuneration across
locations and/or the composition of observable skills between time t and a reference
period—here t = 1985. To construct counterfactual CDFs F ct (·)—so-called ‘what
if’ scenarios—I manipulate either the conditional distribution of wages Ft(·|G, T ),
and/or the CDF of observable characteristics Ft(G, T ).
Quantity re-weighting. With the first counterfactual scenario, I intend to
draw implications on the role of changes in the skill composition across locations.
It represents the selective sorting on observables (for example, skill groups) across
space. I hold the distribution of observable characteristics across locations Fat(T |G)
fixed to a reference period—here 1985. However, I allow the overall distribution of
7See, for example, Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2008).
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observables Fbt(G) to change as it actually did.
F ct (G, T ) =
∫
Fa1985(T |G)Fbt(G)dGdT (3.4)
Price re-weighting. Next, I abstract from spatial differential changes of ob-
served and/or unobserved skill prices over time. First, I adjust the conditional
means that serve as observed (skill) prices mt(G, T ) to represent the relationship
with location size in the reference period—here 1985.
mct(G, T ) = mt(G) + (m1985(G, T )−mt,1985(G)), (3.5)
with mt(G) =
∫
mt(G, T )Fa1985(T |G)dT . The difference between group means
and location-specific group means remains constant at the 1985 values—that is,
m1985(G, T ) − mt,1985(G). This means the urban wage premium remains constant
across the time conditional on observable characteristics. For the calculation of con-
ditional means mt(G), however, I account for changes in the mass of workers—that
is, mt(G) =
∫
mt(G, T )Fa1985(T |G)dT . Second, I construct counterfactual distribu-
tions of within-group inequality F ct (|G, T = s). To analyze the extent to which
residual inequality changed across different locations, I apply the CIC procedure
of Athey and Imbens (2006), which represents an extension of the difference-in-
differences method. I assign each residual value of the actual distribution to the
corresponding change of a reference location—here the rural district T = 0—to con-
struct the counterfactual distribution. First, I determine for each residual value its
corresponding percentile in the reference group. Then I impose for each percentile
in the actual distribution the change in the reference group over time
F ct (|G, T = s) = Ft(|G, T = 0)
(
F−11985(|G, T = 0)(F1985(|G, T = s))
)
. (3.6)
The application of the CIC method allows me to construct two counterfactual sce-
narios. The first counterfactual scenario is without any adjustment of the conditional
mean. I only adjust the residuals. The second counterfactual scenario additionally
adjusts the urban wage premium for each group of workers to 1985 values. Finally,
I follow the same procedure as before but construct a counterfactual scenario that
excludes the composition of observed characteristics.
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3.3.3 Decomposition
For each time period, I calculate the change in a distributional statistic νt,1985, since
t = 1985. Then I compare the difference between changes in actual inequality
ν (Ft,1985(y)) and counterfactual inequality ν
(
F ct,1985(y)
)
to isolate the effect of loca-
tion size. One shortcoming of this approach is that it rules out general equilibrium
effects by assumption. It relies on the assumption of invariant conditional distribu-
tions that requires changes in marginal distributions Ft(G, T ) and conditional wage
distributions Ft(·|G, T ) to be independent. Changes in the remuneration do not
affect the number of workers and vice versa. One advantage of this approach of
double differencing is, however, that it removes any common distributional elements
like the importance of locational fundamentals. All assumptions together allow me
to decompose the difference-in-differences ∆νo into a composition effect and a price
effect:
∆νo = νt,1985 (Ft(y))− νt,1985 (F ct (y)) (3.7)
= νt,1985(Ft(G, T ))− νt,1985(F ct (G, T ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆νG
+ νt,1985(Ft(y|G, T ))− νt,1985(F ct (y|G, T ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆νp
The composition effect ∆νG represents differences in the composition of observable
skills Fat(T |G), across locations. The price effect ∆νp represents differences in the
relative remuneration of workers across locations, the conditional CDFs Ft(·|G, T ).
It consists of two parts: Conditional means mt(G, T ) serve as observed skill prices in
different locations. Changes in Ft(|G, T ) solely reflect an unobserved price effect.
To interpret changes in Ft(|G, T ), as changes in unobserved prices I assume a
time-invariant conditional distribution of unobserved skill quantities. I follow Juhn,
Murphy, and Pierce (1993) to interpret each residual it(G, T ) as a product of two
unobservables it(G, T ) = ρt(G, T )uit(G, T ), where uit(G, T ) represents the quantity
and ρt(G, T ) the return to unobserved skills. I assume the mean and variance of
the distribution of unobserved characteristics u(G, T ) to be independent of time for
groups of workers with the same observable characteristics. This allows me to inter-
pret changes in Ft(|G, T ) solely as changes in the prices of unobserved skills. Any
change in the composition of unobservables within groups over time drops out due
to the differencing across time. Please note, however, that unobservable individual
characteristics—for example, analytical, social skills, or match-specific ability—are
still allowed to change over time. Hence, this assumption does not deviate from
the literature on within-group wage inequality, where theoretical explanations focus
on the effect of technological progress and organizational change on unobservable
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individual characteristics. The only assumption here is that the distribution of un-
observed characteristics within groups of workers with similar observables does not
change over time.
All assumptions together allow me to draw implications on the effect of sorting,
the effect of spatial differential changes in observed skill prices Ft(y−mt(G, T )|G, T ),
and/or spatial differential changes in unobserved skill prices Ft(|G, T ) for the de-
velopment of wage inequality.
3.3.4 Regression-based decompositions
The previous procedure matches workers directly on their observable characteristics,
G, and work place location, T . This allows a complete nonparametric specification
of mean and residual wages. One shortcoming of this approach is that the common
support assumption might not be fulfilled for small sample sizes if one wants to
include a more detailed set of observable characteristics. Hence, to introduce addi-
tional worker- and firm-specific controls, I will follow the approach inspired by Juhn,
Murphy, and Pierce (1993). This requires applying a more parametric approach,
where group means and residuals are predicted after a simple linear regression.
I regress the (log) wage yigjst of each worker i in location s at time t on skill
groups g plus one additional indicator variable j that represents worker- or firm-
specific characteristics and varies with the specification. I estimate the regression
separately for each year to allow time-varying returns to observable characteristics.
Additionally, I interact the independent variables with an indicator of location size
to account for location-specific effects, and to be able to adjust the distribution of
observables. This gives the following specification to estimate the contribution of
observable skills g and additional observable characteristics j for the (log) wage yigjst
of each worker i in location s at time t:
ln yigjst = αgst + βgjt + δjst + igjst. (3.8)
In a first step, I predict conditional means mgjst. In a second step, I predict within-
group variance terms after a regression of 2 from the first step on the same set
of indicators, as there is not enough information within each cell due to the small
sample size. To analyze the different contributions of observable characteristics for
the development of wage inequality over time, I decompose the overall variance in
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log wages V ar(ln yigjst) into “between” and “residual” parts:
V ar(ln yigjst) =
∑
g,j,s
θgjstV ar(αgst + βgjt + δjst) +
∑
g,j,s
θgjstV ar(gjst), (3.9)
where θgjst is the share of group gjs at time t. The first term represents the between
part and the second term the within part of the overall variance in log wages. I con-
struct counterfactuals similar to the previous analysis. First, I re-weight quantities
with θgjs1985. Second, I adjust residual variances according to
V arc(gjst) = V ar(gj0t) + V ar(gjs1985)− V ar(gj01985). (3.10)
3.4 Data
Decomposing the role of urbanization in wage inequality requires individual-specific
information about wages, education, age, occupation, job tasks, firm-specific data
about industry and firm size, as well as location-specific data about the population
density of the workplace district.
3.4.1 Employment data
This study uses the Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies (SIAB 1975–
2010), a two percent random sample from the full population of the Integrated
Employment Biographies provided by the Institute of Employment Research at the
Federal Employment Agency.8
I select the sample in a way that limits the possibility that any kind of dis-
crimination (that is, gender or ethnicity) or structural differences between groups of
workers (that is, employment status) influence the results. I restrict the sample to
German men aged between 21 and 60 years who are employed full-time. I account
for multiple job holdings per year and include only observations with one full-time
job per year. Hence, workers work at least 27 weeks (185 days) in their job per year.
This ensures that I also exclude part-time jobs and jobs in which individuals work
less than 50 days per calendar year—the so-called “mini-jobs” (only included after
1999) or jobs in which individuals are undergoing training. Note that workers with
8See Dorner, Heining, Jacobebbinghaus, and Seth (2010); vom Berge, Koenig, and Seth (2013).
Data access was provided via on-site use at the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the German Federal
Employment Agency (BA) at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) and subsequently
remote data access.
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a mini-job do not earn more than a legally restricted threshold (for example, EUR
400 in the year 2009). Including them would bias the results. To restrict to full-time
workers, I exclude any observation with a daily wage below the marginal part-time
income threshold. For example, I exclude any observation with a daily wage less
than EUR 13.15 in year 2009.
I select the time period between 1985 and 2009 because wage inequality started
to increase in Germany during the mid-1980s. The data also suffers from a structural
break in 1984. Bonus payments as well as other one-time payments come on top
from 1984 onward. Then I pool years together to improve the precision of the results.
For example, I pool the years 1985 to 1987 for the base period, and the years 2008
to 2010 for the end period. This ensures that enough information is included for the
analysis. I only concentrate on West Germany, due to structural differences (wage
structure, demographic composition, and unemployment rates) between East and
West Germany for the years 1985 to 2009.
Earnings information in the SIAB data is right-censored at the social security
maximum. According to Card et al. (2013), around 11 percent of male wages are
censored each year. Top percentiles, however, play a large role in the development
of wage inequality. I follow the imputation procedure of Dustmann, Ludsteck, and
Schoenberg (2009) to fully address the problem of censoring. For this, I estimate
separate interval regressions for each year. Interval regressions are a generalization
of the tobit regression and account for any kind of truncation or censoring. I include
three-way interactions between three education-group dummies, six age-group dum-
mies, and eight location-group dummies as controls. I impute the right-censored
values as the sum of predicted wages and an error term drawn from a normal dis-
tribution. The imputed daily wages then allow me to compute a richer set of wage
residuals. In sum, the selected sample, together with the data limitations, provides
a lower bound of overall wage inequality in Germany.
To measure work experience, I classify eight age groups (21–28, 29–33, 34–39,
40–45, 45–51, and 52–60 years). The demographic composition of the workforce
changed over time. The share of old workers increased, whereas the share of the
youngest cohort declined drastically. The share of full-time working men aged 21
to 28, for example, declined from 21 percent in 1985 to 12 percent in 2009. On
the other side, the share of full-time working men aged 40 to 45 increased from 15
percent in 1985 to 22 percent in 2009.
To control for skill, I define three different education categories: low (without
completed vocational training and post-secondary education that is no Abitur),
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medium (completed vocational training/apprenticeship and/or a high school degree
that is Abitur), and high (graduated from a university or university of applied sci-
ences). Between 1985 and 2009, on average, 16 percent of the selected sample com-
prises low-educated, 73 percent medium-educated, and 11 percent highly educated
workers. The overall education level of the workforce increased over time. From
1985 to 2009, the share of highly educated workers increased steadily (from eight
percent in 1985 to 15 percent in 2009). Correspondingly, the share of low-educated
workers declined (from 20 percent in 1985 to 14 percent in 2009).
Later in the analysis, I rely on additional measures of skill. I use a classification of
occupations into 12 different categories introduced by Blossfeld (1985): agricultural
occupations, simple manual occupations, qualified manual professions, technicians,
engineers, simple services, qualified services, semi professions, professions, simple
commercial and administrative professions, qualified commercial and administrative
professions, and managers.
Moreover, I control for different main job tasks performed at each occupation.
For this, I merge information based on the expert database BERUFENET of the
German Federal Employment Agency provided by Dengler, Matthes, and Paulus
(2014). The data differentiates between five main job tasks: analytical non-routine
tasks, interactive non-routine tasks, cognitive routine tasks, manual routine tasks,
and manual non-routine tasks.
I merge establishment characteristics, like the place of work, the size of the
firm (that is, the total number of employees), and the branch of economic activity
from the Establishment History Panel (BHP) to the individual characteristics of the
SIAB file. To control for firm size, I generate five groups based on the information
on the number of full-time workers per establishment. The size of the firms ranges
between 0–9, 10–49, 50–199, 200–499, and above 500 workers. As a measure for
the different industry structures, I construct 10 groups based on time-consistent
one-digit industry codes of the classification of economic activities (w93).
3.4.2 Population data and consumer price index
Information on population density and the consumer price index (CPI) comes from
the German Statistical Office (Destatis). I deflate wages with the national CPI and
choose 1995 as the base year. To define rural and urban areas, I combine information
about population density with a classification scheme from the Institute for Research
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on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development (BBSR). T = 0 represents rural
and T = 1, ..., 7 urban districts.
Then I allocate urban districts to eight different size classes according to the
percentiles of the urban population density distribution in 2009. Hence, T = 7
represents the largest, most densely populated urban locations.
3.5 Results
To identify the role of urbanization in wage inequality, I compare the change in
actual inequality with counterfactual changes in inequality. I use the actual trends
in wage inequality (variance and percentile gaps) from Table 3.1 as the benchmark
for the subsequent analysis. Specifically, I study the contribution of (i) increased
sorting of workers across locations and (ii) changes in relative remuneration for skills
across locations of different sizes. With the first counterfactual scenario (CF1),
I examine the contribution of sorting and fix the distribution of workers at the
1985 values. With the second counterfactual scenario (CF2a), I presume the same
change in residual wages across all locations conditional on skill. Then I examine the
importance of distinct changes in the wages of several skill groups across locations
that differ in size. But, in addition, I hold the impact of location size within skill
groups constant over time (CF2b). This gives me the full effect of location size
for wage inequality. Finally, I abstract from skill groups (CF3) to highlight the
importance of the observed skill composition for the location-inequality premium.
3.5.1 Decomposing the role of urbanization for wage in-
equality
Sorting. Table 3.2 presents percentage reductions in the change in counterfactual
statistics relative to actual inequality statistics.9 Column 1 shows that sorting across
locations was not important for the change in wage inequality during any of the
sample periods. Shifts in the skill composition across locations had almost no effect
on any measure of wage inequality.
Residual Prices. I reweight quantity, as in Column 1, and residual components
together. To construct counterfactual residual distributions, I apply the CIC pro-
cedure with rural locations as the reference group and urban locations as different
9For similar results of residual wage inequality, see Table 3..4 in the Appendix ??.
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“treatment groups.” This method presumes for urban workers within a specific skill
group the same change in unobserved skill prices (that is, residual wages) as in rural
areas. Mean log wages within the skill group, mt(G), however, vary freely over time.
Column 2, Panel (a) documents a relatively higher growth of actual compared to
counterfactual inequality. It documents a reduction in the growth of the variance in
wages by 28 percent between 1985 and 2009. If observed quantities and unobserved
skill prices had not changed across locations as they did, the variance of log (real)
wages would have grown 28 percent less than it actually did. The main contribution
to the increase in wage inequality comes from a greater dispersion of unobserved
skill prices across locations over time. The relevance of unobserved skill prices for
the location size effect, however, is unbalanced between the upper and lower parts
of the distribution. For the 85–50 percentile gap, Panel (b) documents a reduction
in inequality by 77 percent between 1985 and 2009. For the 50–15 percentile gap,
Panel (c) reports a rise of 17 percent.
Total Prices. Column 3 presents the full effect of location size for wage in-
equality. The results indicate that a greater dispersion of unobserved and observed
skill prices in larger locations have contributed to the location-inequality premium.
Panels (b) and (c) show a positive effect of location size for the 85–50 percentile gap
and a negative effect for the 50–15 percentile gap. Column 3, Panel (a) documents
the full effect of location size. It accounts for around 28 percent of the increase
in the variance, independent of observable skill. Comparisons of Columns 2 and 3
reveal that differences in unobserved skill prices mainly drive the location-inequality
premium.
Skill Composition. A comparison of the results in Column 4 with the results
in Column 3 allows me to draw implications about the importance of the observed
skill composition for the location-inequality premium. The results show that the
effect of location size depends on the observed skill composition. Not accounting
for the observed skill composition reduces the location-inequality premium by 19
percent, from 28 percent to 23 percent. For the 85–50 percentile gaps, the observed
skill composition is highly important. Comparisons of Column 4 with Column 3
show a reduction in the location-inequality premium by 99 percent—from 77 percent
to one percent. For the 50–15 percentile gaps, however, not accounting for the
observed skill composition leads to a reversion of sign, from -17 percent to 12 percent.
In sum, the results so far show that workers are increasingly paid unequally in
West German cities. The decomposition suggests that wage inequality would have
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Table 3.2: The role of urbanization in the development of total log
wage inequality
CF1 CF2a CF2b CF3
Re-weighting: Quantities Residuals Total Prices Total Prices
and Quantities and Quantities and Quantities
(a) Variance
1985 to 2001 -2% 47% 47% 35%
1985 to 2009 -2% 28% 28% 23%
(b) 85–50 Percentile Gap
1985 to 2001 5% 93% 81% -18%
1985 to 2009 2% 70% 77% 1%
(c) 50–15 Percentile Gap
1985 to 2001 -6% -16% -17% 18%
1985 to 2009 -5% -17% -17% 12%
Source: SIAB sample for full-time working men between 21 and 60 years of age.
Notes: N = 533, 765. The numbers indicate the reduction in the growth of total log wage inequality.
For each counterfactual scenario (listed in the column headers), the development of inequality measures
are compared to the actual change (see Table 3.1, Panel (b), Columns 5–7).
Interpretation: Column 2, Panel (a) documents a reduction in the growth of the variance in wages by
28 percent between 1985 and 2009. Without changes in observed quantities and unobserved skill prices
across locations, the variance in log (real) wages would have grown 28 percent less than it actually did.
grown 28 percent less than it actually did, when I shut down location size-specific
wage developments. This general result is in line with the recent findings of Baum-
Snow and Pavan (2013) for the US, where a more rapid growth in larger locations
explains around 23 percent of the overall increase in the variance in wages between
1979 and 2007. A conservative comparison of the results with the findings of Baum-
Snow and Pavan (2013) confirms the importance of more rapid growth in within-
group inequality in larger locations compared to smaller locations. However, changes
in observed skill prices were less important for the development of wage inequality
in West Germany. Baum-Snow and Pavan (2013) also find evidence of a larger
dispersion in the prices of observed skills. Hence, they even play the opposite role in
West Germany than in the US, pushing the location-inequality premium down rather
than up. Moreover, the decomposition reports a different importance of location size
for the upper and lower parts of the wage distribution in West Germany. Specifically,
Baum-Snow and Pavan (2013) find for the US that location size effects were large
and positive at the upper part of the wage distribution and small (but still positive)
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at the lower part of the distribution. In West Germany, however, the effects are
massive and positive at the upper part of the wage distribution but negative (and
sizable) at the lower part of the distribution. This asymmetric effect of location on
the upper and lower tails of the wage distribution has also been recently described
by Ma and Tang (2016) for the US.
3.5.2 Unequal pay in cities: The role of worker and firm
characteristics
To better understand the underlying channels and differences between the US and
Germany, I proceed to analyze how differences between worker and firm character-
istics affect the location-inequality premium. I consider a richer set of observable
characteristics to investigate the role of location size in determining the change in
wage inequality independently of additional direct measures of skill. I control for
the distribution of industry (10 categories), occupation (12 categories), and main
job task (five categories) across localities. I include occupations or main job tasks
(analytical non-routine, interactive non-routine, cognitive-routine, manual-routine,
and manual non-routine) as additional indicators to control for the spatial dimen-
sion of the technological change and to examine the spatial dimension of relative
changes in job tasks across time. Furthermore, I add an indicator for firm size (five
categories) as a proxy for the heterogeneity of firm productivities across locations.
From now on, I follow the regression-based approach introduced above. I have to
switch the methodology because the SIAB data set does not provide enough infor-
mation to define for each specific group residuals and mean wages in a nonparametric
way as was done before. Recall that the common support condition requires every
value of each covariate to appear in combination with every value of skill groups
across locations. To fulfill the assumption of common support, I follow the standard
solution proposed in the literature and redefine the groups of observable charac-
teristics. I define four age groups and combine them with three education groups.
This gives me 12 demographic groups that I use as controls for skill. To construct
counterfactuals, I proceed as before.
Occupational structure or job tasks. The classification of occupations highly
correlates with the job tasks structure in such a way that the decomposition provides
similar results for both of them. Table 3.3 shows the results with 12 occupation
groups and Table 3..7 in the Appendix reports the results with five main job tasks.
Columns 4 to 6 report the effects of changing quantities and prices together. Column
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4 shows that accounting for occupation or job tasks, location size has more or less
no impact on the growth of the between-variance component over the full sample
period. Columns 5 and 6 report a location-inequality premium of 25 percent for the
residual variance and 18 percent for the total variance over the full sample period.
Comparisons of Panel (a) and (b) show that up to one-half of the location-inequality
premium is due to the different occupational or job task structures across locations.
This effect is mainly driven by changes in residual prices. The sorting of workers
across locations within occupations or the main job task explains only a small part
of the increase in wage inequality over time. Hence, occupations or main job tasks
with a greater increase in wage inequality have already been concentrated in larger
locations in 1985.
Firm size distribution or industrial structure. Next, to analyze the impor-
tance of differences between firms, I account for the spatial pattern of industries and
the firm size distribution. Tables 3..5 and 3..6 in the Appendix report the results
of the decomposition with five firm-size groups or 10 industry groups as additional
controls. Both specifications are comparable to the previous results. They report
31 percent to 26 percent for the residual variance and 16 percent to 18 percent of
the total variance. Most of the location-inequality premium is due to increases in
residual inequality. A comparison of Panels (a) and (b), however, shows that the
firm size distribution explains only one-third of the location-inequality premium. A
different remuneration within the same firm-size group across locations contributes
slightly to the location-inequality premium. For example, high-wage workers in large
firms face higher inequality in larger locations compared to smaller locations. Up to
one-fourth is due to the industrial composition.
In sum, the results suggest that a more heterogeneous compensation of workers
with the same occupation or the same main job task explains around one-half of
the location-inequality premium. In contrast, firm size explains only one-third of
the location-inequality premium, while industry structure across locations explains
only one-fourth. The largest part of the location-inequality premium is due to
a more rapid growth in inequality between workers with an initially high within-
group inequality in larger cities. I conclude that changes in the compensation of
worker characteristics explain most of the location premium. Workers in high-wage
occupations—for example, engineers or managers—now face higher inequality in
larger locations compared to smaller locations.
90
3.5.3 A breakdown of the location-inequality premium
The previous results have shown that the specifications with occupations or main
job tasks as additional controls explain the largest part of the location-inequality
premium. Now, I calculate how much the skill sorting across locations and the
composition of locations explain the size of the effect. For each specification, I
compare again the actual with the counterfactual change in the variance in log
wages. But I calculate the counterfactual with only location size as a covariate in
the regression (that is, I exclude skill groups). This gives me a location-inequality
premium that varies according to the sample size of each specification, and allows
me to isolate the role of worker and firm characteristics in relation to the location-
inequality premium.
Table 3.3: Changes in the variance of log wages: The role of occupa-
tions
Re-weighting: Quantities Prices and Quantities
Between Residual Total Between Residual Total
(a) Skill, Occupation, and Location Size
1985 to 2001 -1% -2% -2% -6% 24% 14%
1985 to 2009 -1% -2% -1% -1% 16% 9%
(b) Skill and Location Size
1985 to 2001 -5% -1% -2% 23% 39% 33%
1985 to 2009 -3% -1% -2% 9% 25% 18%
Source: SIAB sample for full-time working men between 21 and 60 years of age.
Notes: N = 527, 061. Analogously to Tables 3..4 and 3.2, the numbers indicate a reduction in growth
between the actual and counterfactual development of variance in wages. Counterfactual adjustments
of prices and/or quantities are calculated as before. But group means and residuals are predicted after
running a regression model that also includes occupation indicators interacted with age or education
and separately with location size categories.
Figure 3.2 summarizes the breakdown of the location-inequality premium from
1985 to 2009.10 The header presents the proportion of growth of the variance that is
due to location size. Then, based on the previous results, each pie chart represents
how much the following parts help to explain the location-inequality premium: (i)
skill sorting across locations, (ii) the composition of locations based on the worker
(occupational or main job task composition) or firm characteristics (industry or
10See Tables 3..8 to 3..10 in the Appendix for the individual results of the decomposition.
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Figure 3.2: A breakdown of the location-inequality premium
25%
18%
57%
31%
20%
50%
30%
32%
38%
31%
36%
33%
Industry, LIP: 22% Firm Size, LIP: 27% Main Task, LIP: 26% Occupations, LIP: 26%
Skill sorting Composition Remainder
Notes: The figure plots the breakdown of the location-inequality premium (LIP) for each
specification, including worker or firm characteristics in addition to skill. The following parts
explain the location-inequality premium: (i) skill sorting across locations, (ii) the composition
of locations based on the observable worker (occupational or main job task composition) or
firm characteristics (industry or firm size structure), and (iii) a remainder.
firm size structure), and (iii) a remainder that is difficult to interpret. Baum-Snow
and Pavan (2013) relate the unexplained part to additional productivity generated
through agglomeration economies. All specifications report a location-inequality pre-
mium between 22 and 27 percent, and a remainder between 33 and 57 percent. The
results confirm that worker characteristics—like occupational structure and main
job tasks—are more important than firm characteristics for the location-inequality
premium.
The specification with indicators for industry or firm size as additional covari-
ates in the regression report a location-inequality premium between 22 percent and
26 percent. Skill sorting across locations explains 25 percent to 31 percent of the
location-inequality premium. Industry composition accounts for 18 percent and firm-
size distribution across locations accounts for 20 percent of the location-inequality
premium between 1985 and 2009. Both specifications explain only up to one-half
of the location-inequality premium with a remainder of 50–57 percent. Analogously,
in the specification with occupations as additional covariates, the location-inequality
92
premium is 26 percent. It consists of 31 percent that is due to sorting across lo-
cations, 36 percent that is due to occupational structure, and a remainder of 33
percent. For the specification with main job tasks, I obtain a location-inequality
premium of 26 percent. Sorting across locations explains 30 percent, the main job
task performed by workers explains 32 percent, and 38 percent remains unexplained.
3.6 Conclusions
Urbanization plays a positive role in the rise of German wage inequality between
1985 and 2009. Today, groups of workers who already had unequal pay in 1985
face higher wage dispersion in larger, more densely populated locations compared
to smaller, less densely populated locations. To identify this location-inequality
premium, I construct counterfactual distributions that keep the composition of ob-
servable skills and relative remuneration at 1985 values. Comparisons of actual with
counterfactual changes in inequality reveal that around one-third of the increase
in the variance of wages is due to population density independent of the observed
skill heterogeneity of workers across locations. To account for the most important
explanations, I decompose the change in wage inequality into a composition effect,
which represents the distribution and sorting of workers across locations, and a price
effect, which describes divergent changes in remuneration across space. A higher in-
crease in within-group inequality in larger, more densely populated locations drives
the location-inequality premium. Hence, a larger increase in residual inequality, es-
pecially in larger locations, is important to explain the change in German wage
inequality.
To get a better understanding of the underlying channels of the location-
inequality premium, I study additional worker- and firm-specific dimensions, like
the distribution of firm size, occupational structure, and job tasks. This gives me a
finer depiction of the composition of cities. I calculate how much the skill sorting
across locations and the composition of locations, according to the additional ob-
servable characteristic, explain the size of the effect. Up to one-half of the effect is
due to occupation or main job task, one-third due to firm size, and up to one-fourth
is due to the industrial structure. The largest part of the location-inequality premium
is due to a greater wage inequality within groups of workers that are generally more
concentrated in larger locations. An increased sorting of employees on the basis of
their observable skills did not contribute to the increase in wage inequality since the
mid-1980s. A breakdown of the location-inequality premium, however, reveals that
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the skill sorting of workers within worker- and firm-specific groups explains up to
one-third.
In sum, cities pay their workers in an increasingly unequal manner. The increased
unequal pay of similar workers especially in larger cities is also documented by
Baum-Snow and Pavan (2013) for the US. Some interesting results about the (West)
German experience, however, stand out. First, location size has positive effects at
the upper part and a negative influence at the lower part. Second, the results suggest
that the dispersion of wages between skill groups plays the opposite role in West
Germany compared to the US. I contribute to the literature and show that especially
high-inequality occupations or job tasks drive the location-inequality premium.
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Appendix
Table 3..4: The role of urbanization in the development of residual
log wage inequality
CF1 CF2 CF3
Re-weighting: Quantities Residuals Residuals
and Quantities and Quantities
(a) Variance
1985 to 2001 -1% 59% 25%
1985 to 2009 -1% 40% 1%
(b) 85-50 Percentile Gap
1985 to 2001 -3% 44% -21%
1985 to 2009 -3% 54% -22%
(c) 50-15 Percentile Gap
1985 to 2001 -4% 26% 31%
1985 to 2009 -3% 16% 15%
Source: SIAB sample for full-time working men between 21 and 60 years
of age.
Notes: N = 533, 765. The numbers indicate the reduction in growth of
total log wage inequality. For each counterfactual scenario (listed in the
column headers), the development of inequality measures is compared
to the actual change (see Table 3.1, Panel (b), Columns 5–7).
Interpretation: Column 2, Panel (a) documents a reduction in growth
of the variance in wages by 28 percent between 1985 and 2009. Without
changes in the observed quantities and unobserved skill prices across lo-
cations, the variance in log (real) wages would have grown 28 percent
less than it actually did.
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Table 3..5: Changes in the variance in log wages: The role of industry
Re-weighting: Quantities Prices and Quantities
Between Residual Total Between Residual Total
(a) Skill, Industry, and Location Size
1985 to 2001 -8% 2% -1% -4% 25% 18%
1985 to 2009 -5% 1% -1% 1% 19% 12%
(b) Skill and Location Size
1985 to 2001 -5% -1% -2% 0% 36% 27%
1985 to 2009 -3% 0% -1% -1% 26% 16%
Source: SIAB sample for full-time working men between 21 and 60 years of age.
Notes: N = 533, 765. Analogously to Tables 3..4 and 3.2, the numbers indicate a reduction in growth
between the actual and counterfactual development of the variance in wages. Counterfactual adjust-
ments of prices and/or quantities are calculated as before. But group means and residuals are predicted
after running a regression model that also includes one-digit industry indicators interacted with age or
education and separately with location size categories.
Table 3..6: Changes in the variance in log wages: The role of firm size
Re-weighting: Quantities Prices and Quantities
Between Residual Total Between Residual Total
(a) Skill, Firm Size, and Location Size
1985 to 2001 -4% 0% -1% -7% 35% 22%
1985 to 2009 -2% 0% -1% -3% 25% 13%
(b) Skill and Location Size
1985 to 2001 -3% -2% -2% 9% 45% 33%
1985 to 2009 -2% -1% -2% 1% 31% 18%
Source: SIAB sample for full-time working men between 21 and 60 years of age.
Notes: N = 533, 767. Analogously to Tables 3..4 and 3.2, the numbers indicate a reduction in growth
between the actual and counterfactual development of the variance in wages. Counterfactual adjust-
ments of prices and/or quantities are calculated as before. But group means and residuals are predicted
after running a regression model that also includes firm size indicators interacted with age or education
and separately with location size categories.
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Table 3..7: Changes in the variance in log wages: The role of main job
task
Re-weighting: Quantities Prices and Quantities
Between Residual Total Between Residual Total
(a) Skill, Main Job Task, and Location Size
1985 to 2001 -3% -1% -2% -5% 36% 21%
1985 to 2009 -2% 0% -1% -2% 20% 10%
(b) Skill and Location Size
1985 to 2001 -4% -1% -2% 22% 41% 34%
1985 to 2009 -3% -1% -2% 11% 25% 18%
Source: SIAB sample for full-time working men between 21 and 60 years of age.
Notes: N = 516, 976. Analogously to Tables 3..4 and 3.2, the numbers indicate a reduction in growth
between the actual and counterfactual development of the variance in wages. Counterfactual adjust-
ments of prices and/or quantities are calculated as before. But group means and residuals are predicted
after running a regression model that also includes main job task indicators interacted with age or ed-
ucation and separately with location size categories.
Table 3..8: A breakdown of the location-inequality premium: Industry
Between Residual Total
(a) 1985 to 2001
Total location size-specific 25% 30% 29%
Skill sorting across locations 101% -19% 6%
Group sorting across locations 13% 37% 32%
Remainder -14% 83% 62%
(b) 1985 to 2009
Total location size-specific 27% 18% 22%
Skill sorting across locations 104% -41% 25%
Group sorting across locations -7% 40% 18%
Remainder 4% 102% 57%
Source: SIAB sample for full-time working men between 21 and 60 years of age.
Notes: N = 533, 765.
100
Table 3..9: A breakdown of the location-inequality premium: Firm size
Between Residual Total
(a) 1985 to 2001
Total location size-specific 33% 43% 40%
Skill sorting across locations 74% -4% 17%
Group sorting across locations 47% 21% 28%
Remainder -21% 83% 55%
(b) 1985 to 2009
Total location size-specific 27% 26% 26%
Skill sorting across locations 95% -18% 31%
Group sorting across locations 16% 23% 20%
Remainder -11% 96% 50%
Source: SIAB sample for full-time working men between 21 and 60 years of age.
Notes: N = 533, 767.
Table 3..10: A breakdown of the location-inequality premium: Main
job task
Between Residual Total
(a) 1985 to 2001
Total location size-specific 40% 42% 41%
Skill sorting across locations 45% 2% 17%
Within-group sorting across locations 68% 12% 31%
Remainder -13% 86% 52%
(b) 1985 to 2009
Total location size-specific 33% 21% 26%
Skill sorting across locations 67% -20% 30%
Within-group sorting across locations 39% 22% 32%
Remainder -6% 98% 38%
Source: SIAB sample for full-time working men between 21 and 60 years of age.
Notes: N = 516, 976.
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Table 3..11: A breakdown of the location-inequality premium: Occu-
pation
Between Residual Total
(a) 1985 to 2001
Total location size-specific 49% 36% 40%
Skill sorting across locations 53% -7% 17%
Group sorting across locations 59% 40% 47%
Remainder -12% 67% 36%
(b) 1985 to 2009
Total location size-specific 36% 19% 26%
Skill sorting across locations 74% -32% 31%
Group sorting across locations 30% 45% 36%
Remainder -4% 87% 33%
Source: SIAB sample for full-time working men between 21 and 60 years of age.
Notes: N = 527, 061.
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Conclusion
In this dissertation I have analyzed the causes and consequences of spatial inequality.
Theoretically, I have applied a quantitative spatial model to study the implica-
tions of European integration and to show that regional income transfers are quan-
titatively important for understanding the spatial allocation of economic activity.
First, the dismantling of trade barriers in Europe has led to a more homogeneous
spatial distribution of economic activity. Second, the abolishment of fiscal equal-
ization in Germany would lead to a moderate welfare gain of about 0.33 percent
implying migration of about 5 percent of the population in the long run.
Empirically, I have shown that in the particular context of (West) Germany,
location size itself is an important driver of economic inequality within regions.
Especially, cities pay their workers in an increasingly unequal manner. Urbanization
contributed about one-third to the growth of overall wage inequality between 1985
and 2009.
A fruitful direction for future research would be, for example, to develop a dy-
namic model and examine how bilateral capital flows affect the spatial distribution
of economic activity. In particular, how investment decisions—in an incomplete
financial markets environment—affect the growth and decline of regions.
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